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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-2a-3 0) (1996). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented to the court for review identified with the 
respective standards of review: 
1. Whether defendant is entitled to a new trial by virtue of surprise evidence, 
specifically that the plaintiff had been demoted the day before trial, which information was 
not disclosed until part way through the trial. A trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial 
or a new trial for surprise evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Roundy v. 
Staley. 984 P.2d 404, 410, 1999 UT App. 229 (Rule 59). The surprise evidence appeared 
in trial on September 26, 2001. (V. 4, p. 91).1 The issue was also preserved by the motion 
for a new trial grounded upon the issue of surprise. (R. 716). 
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to tell the jury the defendant was serving a 
mission for his church in Brazil and thus absent from trial. Connected with this issue is 
whether this error was exacerbated by improper closing arguments. The standard of review 
for the admission of evidence varies depending on the type of evidence at issue. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). In civil cases, the trial court's decision to admit 
evidence or refuse to admit evidence is reviewed under grant of discretion. Id. at 938. 
This issue was preserved by arguments in pre-trial conferences, as well as in the trial itself. 
1
 All references to the trial transcript refer to the volume number. The record 
citation is R.840. 
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(R. 519; R. 571; V.l, p. 31; 1175, ps. 68, 70 and 90). 
3. Whether improper remarks in opening statement and closing argument 
warrant a new trial. The trial court's rulings is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. First 
General Serv. v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480 (Utah App. 1996). Plaintiffs plea to poverty is 
preserved at R.572. Objections to the statements are also found at V. 2, p. 225; V. 6, ps. 
166, 231, and 242; V. 7, p. 18,1. 10; V. 8, ps. 86 and 88. The prejudicial statements are 
reproduced within the brief. Reversal on this issue is also required under the plain error 
standard. State v. Harrison. 419 Utah Adv. Rep.l 1, 2001 UT 33 (April 13, 2001). 
4. Did the trial court err in allowing expert testimony which lacked certainty 
and reliability as required by law. The admissibility of expert testimony under the 
Rimmasch standard is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 
340 (Utah 1997). This issue was preserved via objections which were overruled, (ps. 95, 
112, 118). The trial court's selection, interpretation, and application of a particular rule of 
evidence is reviewed for correctness. Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.. 1999 UT 80, ^  8, 
977 P.2d 508. 
5. Did the trial court err in allowing extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness' 
testimony in rebuttal of evidence introduced by plaintiff. This issue is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion. Astill v. Clark. 956 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Utah App. 1998). This issue was 
preserved via objection at trial. (R. 171). 
6. Was the potential juror Mr. Tarns improperly dismissed for cause. The trial 
court's ruling on whether to dismiss the juror for cause is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
State v. LeLeae. 1999 UT App. 368, ^  23,993 P.2d 232. The issue was preserved at trial. 
(V. l ,p . 101,1. 19; p. 105,1s. 8-12). 
7. Do all of the errors outlined result in cumulative error which undermines this 
court's confidence that a fair trial was had. Cumulative error is an issue of appellate 
review, and therefore a de novo review of the totality of the circumstances is required. 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 530 (Utah 1994); Whitehead v. American Motors Sales 
Corp.. 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASES 
Defendant is unaware of any statutes which are determinative of this case. 
State v. RimmascL 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) and Patev v. Lainhart 1999 UT 31, 
977 P.2d 1193 are determinative in this matter. By virtue of defendant's motion for a new 
trial, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 has been implicated. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Factual Background. This case arises out of an automobile accident involving 
plaintiff Rhonda Merry weather and defendant Carson Callister on February 28, 1997 in 
Tremonton, Utah. (R. 6) As a result of the accident, plaintiff claimed she suffered injuries 
and was eventually diagnosed with myofacial pain syndrome, for which she has received 
treatment from a variety of health care providers continuously since October of 1997. 
Although plaintiff only had one documented visit to a doctor in February of 1997, and a 
single documented visit to a therapist in June of 1997, plaintiff claimed her neck had hurt 
continuously until October of 1997, although she missed no work whatsoever. In October 
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of 1997, plaintiff awoke one morning in such pain that she was hospitalized on a morphine 
drip and has been under chronic pain treatment ever since. Defendant argued the case 
presented a low speed accident which could not have caused the injuries claimed. A 
significant dispute arose concerning the speed of the impact. Further, the medical issues 
surrounding causation of plaintiff s alleged problems were hotly contested. The accident 
was reported by the police as a non-injury accident. 
At trial, plaintiffs experts testified that plaintiff would likely require ongoing 
treatment for the rest of her life. Plaintiffs experts further testified that plaintiff should 
have "discretionary income" or "access" for needs that "may" arise. Based upon this 
testimony, plaintiffs economic expert indicated that plaintiff would suffer lifetime out-of-
pocket expenses including both lost wages and ongoing medical expenses between 1.25 
and 1.75 million dollars. 
Defendant ascertained that a strong argument could be made against plaintiffs 
future wage and medical loss claims based on the fact that in the year prior to trial plaintiff 
was earning a higher income than she had prior to the subject accident. She was working 
50-60 hours a week. This fact undercut plaintiffs assertion of future earnings and 
functional capacity loss. These arguments were presented by defense counsel during 
opening arguments in reliance upon the information brought forth in discovery. Plaintiff 
even conceded defendant's commitment to this position. (V. 5, p. 5, Ins 1-11). Three days 
into trial, and after defendant's opening statement, plaintiff proffered the testimony of her 
job supervisor to the effect that the day before the trial commenced, plaintiff was demoted 
from her high paying job to a job that would be paying her less income and providing less 
hours. Plaintiffs supervisor testified that in his opinion, plaintiffs poor job performance 
was related to her physical limitations and addictive behavior. Plaintiff in no wise had 
disclosed this information to the defendant. 
The plaintiffs demotion at work came as a complete surprise to the defendant. 
Defendant alleged at trial that he could not have guarded against this information through 
discovery and that by virtue of no mention being made of it until midway through trial 
defendant was prejudiced. 
During opening statement, plaintiffs attorney referred to anticipated evidence of 
plaintiffs exorbitant lifetime medical expenses allegedly necessitated by the accident, 
asking the jury a number of times "Who is going to pay?" Defendant alleged at trial that 
the statements on behalf of plaintiff were clearly intended to elicit sympathy from the jury 
because of the allegedly monumental medical bills facing the plaintiff in the future. 
Defendant moved for a mistrial, which motion was denied. 
At the time of trial, defendant Carson Callister was serving as a missionary for the 
LDS church in Brazil. However, the trial judge would not allow defense counsel to tell the 
jury where Mr. Callister was. After urging this ruling, Plaintiffs counsel then improperly 
argued concerning prejudicial reasons for Mr. Callister's absence. 
Defendant also objected to the foundation, specifically under State v. Rimmasch, 
775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1988) and its progeny, to the testimony of Dr. Rollins and Dr. Randal 
which objections were overruled by the court. (R. 95, 112, 118). A thorough analysis of 
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the foundation is provided below. 
During defendant's case in chief, Dr. Scott Knorpp who had performed an exam of 
the plaintiff was called with regard to plaintiffs alleged medical condition and the 
underlying causation therefore. Plaintiffs counsel's cross-examination focused on two 
alleged conversations between Dr. Knorpp and a physical therapist wherein Dr. Knorpp 
allegedly attempted to suborn false testimony from the physical therapist through threats 
and intimidation. Dr. Knorpp denied these allegations. Thereafter, over objection, plaintiff 
called the therapist to rebut testimony elicited from Dr. Knorpp on cross-examination. 
Defendant maintained that it was improper and prejudicial to allow plaintiff to call the 
therapist as a rebuttal witness. The trial court overruled these objections. 
Marshaled evidence regarding future medicals. Plaintiff called a number of 
witnesses who potentially could have testified concerning future medical expenses. Mr. 
David Rollins, a PhD "rehabilitation specialist," testified as the primary witness for ftiture 
plans for treatment. Mr. Rollins is not a medical doctor. (V. 5, ps. 76, 77). He is not a 
psychologist. (P. 77,1. 13). He relied on Dr. Ashburn heavily. (P. 83, Is. 17-18). Mr. 
Rollins testified plaintiff needed "access to the goods and services for the indefinite 
future." (P. 94,1. 24 - p. 95,1. 1). Defendant made the specific foundational objection that 
plaintiff had failed to meet the standard for admissibility under State v. Rimmasch, in that 
the testimony involved a unique type of science. (V.5, ps. 95-96). This objection was 
overruled and no further foundation was required. Mr. Rollins testified the diagnoses in 
his report "is not my diagnosis but the diagnosis came out of the medical records just 
referring to the type of anomaly that she had and the fact that it was secondary to a motor 
vehicle accident." (V.5, p. 97,1. 23 - p. 98,1.1). Mr. Rollins testified: 
Question: Are you saying she is going to see a neurologist ten times, an orthopod 
ten times? What are you telling the jury? 
Answer: I am just saying that she should have access on suitable and 
appropriate basis to these specialists. 
Question: As a group? 
Answer: No. 
Question: Sometimes she may in a given period of time see only a neurologist or 
only psychiatrist or only pediatrist. The idea being that she does needs 
to have access even when the need is there and if she doesn't then 
have that established and doesn't have the discretionary funds to do 
that, she may not be able to access that service from that specialist. 
(P. 100, Is. 7-19). Mr. Rollins stated that his conclusions were made upon a reasonably 
probable medical/rehabilitation basis, but did not provide the foundation for his conclusion. 
Mr. Rollins testified that he got his values for future medical events by taking the median 
of his estimation of the number of visits plaintiff would need "access" to, and the median 
price for those medical doctors. (P. 101, Is. 8-13). 
Mr. Rollins indicated that he found the values from a publication entitled Medacode 
and then tried to adjust those for Northern Utah. (P. 101, Is. 15-25). Mr. Rollins did not 
testify how Medacode came up with those values or whether Medacode is a compilation of 
data typically used by experts in his area, or whether it is reliable. Mr. Rollins claimed that 
his opinion was based upon "rehabilitation probabilities," but did not explain the basis of 
his conclusion. No underlying data was discussed. Mr. Rollins testified concerning his 
report, which was also entered over defendant's objection (P. 99,1. 14) that plaintiff would 
need "access" to physicians, "access" to vocational counseling, "access" to a health club, 
7 
psychological counseling, "access" to a homemaker chore person, and "access" to medical 
devices she might need, including a possible and implantable simulator, as well as an 
implantable pump. Mr. Rollins also testified that the plaintiff would need $750.00 a year 
in medications for the remainder of her life. Mr. Rollins testified that including in his 
estimations was $20,000.00 every seven years for implants. That therefore the plaintiff 
would need seven to eight implants in her lifetime. (P. 109). Mr. Rollins testified that the 
maintenance of the device would be $500.00, half of which was for actual medication. 
Mr. Rollins assumed plaintiff would go with a medication pump as opposed to any 
other devices he mentioned, although he did not indicate the basis of his belief. (P. 106-
111). Mr. Rollins indicated that medication for the pump would constitute half of the 
$7,500.00 figure. Mr. Rollins did not discount his conclusion of half the $7,500.00, if the 
plaintiff used a device that did not require medication. Mr. Rollins while testifying that 
half the $7,500.00 figure would be for maintenance did indicate that the devices typically 
had a warranty of three to four years. (P. 109,1. 18). Accordingly, Mr. Rollins' 
calculations of $7,500.00 a year did not account for the fact that there would be periods of 
three to four years where the device would be covered by warranty, with intervening 
periods of approximately two years where the actual costs of maintenance might potentially 
be borne by the plaintiff. Mr. Rollins indicated that he got his estimations for repair from 
"Aeromactronics," but because the court did not require further foundation, the exact basis 
of his conclusion is unknown. Voir dire was had by the defendant where Mr. Rollins 
testified as follows: 
Question: And how many rehabilitation specialists do what you do. 
Answer: I wouldn't have any idea, probably several hundred. 
Question: The school that you attended to receive your PHD degree no longer 
offers a PHD degree in your area, does it. 
Answer: Not in that area. They still offer the degree, but in different areas. 
(P. 112, Is. 11-16). Thus, Mr. Rollins indicated that he did not even know how many like 
experts were in existence, but admitting that he had no idea, guessed at several hundred. 
The school that he received his degree from does not even offer his degree anymore. 
Defendant renewed his motion that greater foundation needed to be laid under Rimmasch 
to meet the gate keeping function of the court. (P. 112,1. 19). Further, the defendant 
objected on the same Rimmasch standard to Dr. Randall's testimony. Dr. Randall was an 
economist who simply took the numbers which Mr. Rollins gave him and extrapolated 
therefrom. The court denied this motion as well. (P. 118, Is. 15-17). 
Mr. Rollins testified that absent "funding" plaintiff would be unable to have regular 
foil time or part time work. (P. 120, Is. 118-122). He testified that absent the accident "it's 
reasonably or occasionally probable that Mrs. Merry weather would be currently providing 
traditional nursing care in a hospital setting." (P. 125,1. 23 - p. 126,1. 2). 
On cross examination, Mr. Rollins reaffirmed he was not a medical doctor and 
made no medical diagnosis. (P. 136,1. 14). Mr. Rollins verified that he had believed that 
the plaintiff had suffered a herniated disc, which was wrong. (P. 138, Is. 2-4). Mr. Rollins 
was not aware of any study or exam which showed the cause of the plaintiffs pain. (P. 
139,1. 32). Dr. Rollins testified as follows: 
Question: Would you please give us an idea of how many cases of cervical 
whiplash with no positive radiographic signs of injury you have dealt 
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with in the course of your career as rehabilitation expert. 
Answer: I would have no way of knowing because I don't deal with the 
diagnosis. 
(P. 140, Is. 6-11). Mr. Rollins testified as further: 
Question: Let me ask you to assume that during the acute period right after her 
accident, starting February 28, she saw Dr. Chad Merrill once on 
February 28, and then the records show a June 9th physical therapy 
visit and no other medical treatment, no other visit to a medical doctor 
until October 17, during which time she continued to function, go to 
work, not miss any employment. Wouldn't that lead you to believe 
that either those doctors you say she needs are not related to this 
accident or perhaps she doesn't need to see them. 
Answer: Well, it's not a matter of need. It's a matter of access on an as needed 
basis as a preventative measure to have access to those specialists to 
prevent her problem from becoming progressively worse. If we want 
to maintain her highest level of function I agree with Dr. Ashburn, she 
needs to be monitored and needs to be engaged with specialists who 
can monitor preventative measures of care to keep her as functional as 
she can be in spite of her pain, in spite of her limitations. 
(P. 144,1.8-p. 145,1. 1). 
Mr. Rollins admitted that he had not done anything to validate his conclusions 
regarding lost wages. (P. 146, Is. 20-22). Mr. Rollins testified that his line of work is not 
an exact science, but an art. He testified that: 
Question: Dr. Rollins, would you agree that what you do is not an exact science. 
Answer: I would say that most people, therapy, support people, rehab people, 
follow more of an artform, but they do rely on scientific information, 
statistical data, etc. But a lot of it is just like nursing, personal nursing 
care has a lot to do with art. Art of dealing with people. 
(P. 147, Is. 14-20). Further Mr. Rollins testified: 
Question: But you continue to say that her lifetime wage loss will reflect that 
change in her current behaviors from returning to work and over 
achieving. 
Answer: It can. I am not saying it will. It can and it happens in many instances 
where you have individuals who have perfectionist-like attitudes who 
want to please, who want to demonstrate that they can contribute to 
the well-being of another human being. And by making that effort 
which is very virtuous is sometimes self-defeating. It sometimes is 
their undoing. 
(P. 149, Is. 7-16). Mr. Rollins testified that he does not follow up on the majority of his 
patients to see if his conclusions were correct. (Ps. 153-154). 
Dr. Michael Ashburn, a professor of anaesthesiology and a medical doctor who has 
conducted a fellowship in pain management, testified as one of the plaintiffs treating 
physicians. (V. 4, p. 6,1. 20; p. 7,1. 15). Dr. Ashburn explained the diagnosis and 
treatment of chronic pain. (Ps. 27-29). Dr. Ashburn indicated that the plaintiff would be 
on medication for the rest of her life. (P. 33,1. 17). Dr. Ashburn testified that currently 
plaintiff was using a fentanyl patch which is 100 times more powerful than morphine. (P. 
36,1. 13). Dr. Ashburn diagnosed plaintiff with myofacial pain syndrome, as well as facet 
arthrosis, generalized anxiety disorder, and sleep disturbance. (P. 43, Is. 1-10). He 
indicated that his examination of the plaintiff showed her to have spasming in the muscles 
of her neck and shoulder areas. (P. 45, Is. 4-5). 
While Dr. Ashburn testified that the plaintiff would need medication for the rest of 
her life, he was not specific as to what medication she would need. (P. 56,1. 18). Dr. 
Ashburn indicated that the plaintiff had had nerve blocks in the past, (Ps. 54-59), and that 
the plaintiff might need implantable therapy. (P. 67, Is. 10-25). Dr. Ashburn did not testify. 
that Rhonda Merry weather would need an implant for the rest of her life, but that an 
implant pump would need to be tried on a trial basis. (P. 73,1. 12). Whether or not the 
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implant was to be used was a decision to be left up to the plaintiff. (P. 77,1. 24). Dr. 
Ashburn indicated that if the implant were done, that he would see the plaintiff 
approximately every 90 days. (P. 83,1. 9). Refills for the medication would be taken care 
of through the mail. (P. 83,1. 8). Dr. Ashburn estimated that the plaintiff would need to 
see a doctor 8 to 12 times a year for the rest of her life (P. 84,1. 20), although he did not 
explain exactly who she would see and why. Clearly, the doctor was not referring to 
himself as he had already indicated that he would see her only every 90 days. The doctor 
testified that that "may mean" a neurologist, othropod, physiatrist, pain expert, etc. (P. 85, 
1. 1). As to whether she can perform her job duties, Dr. Ashburn testified: "I don't have 
enough personal information available to me to make a determination that she can perform 
her duties adequately." (P. 95,1. 17). Dr. Ashburn testified that pain can result from no 
structural abnormality. (P. 99,1. 3). 
Dr. Ashburn testified that pain can be totally psychological in nature. (P. 99,1. 10). 
Dr. Ashburn recognized the plaintiff had gone nearly eight months between the accident of 
February of 1997 and October of 1997 without seeing a doctor. Dr. Ashburn was not 
aware that in the eight months between the accident of February of 1997 and October of 
1997 that the plaintiff only had one documented physical therapy visit. (P. 102,1. 9). Dr. 
Ashburn did believe there was a "mechanical" reason for the pain. (P. 104,1. 13). Only 
ten percent of his practice consists of persons who had suffered cervical whiplashes. (P. 
108,1. 8). Dr. Ashburn was not aware that the plaintiff had been working 50 to 60 hour 
weeks. (P. 118,1. 15). Dr. Ashburn stated that his pain clinic had occupational therapists, 
(P. 128,1. 13, p. 129,1. 3), but plaintiff had not received such services at his institution. (P.. 
128,1. 16-p. 128,1.7). 
Dr. Bryson Smith, a neurosurgeon, discussed his treatment of plaintiff. He stated 
there was no objective findings of nerve root or spinal cord compromise. (P. 159,1. 2). He 
simply supervised the October, 1997, hospitalization of plaintiff, and believed that the 
October hospitalization was related to the motor vehicle accident. (P. 172,1. 16). Dr. 
Smith acknowledged that neck pain problems can develop without any known cause. (P. 
176, Is. 1-3). Dr. Smith acknowledged that his notes indicated that the plaintiff denied 
neck pain upon discharge of the hospital on October, 1997. (P. 182,1. 17). He gave her no 
restrictions concerning her employment when he discharged her. (P. 183,1. 6). Dr. Smith 
acknowledged that to use a morphine drip or pump for patients for who have neck 
problems is not very common. (P. 183,1. 9). 
Dr. Merrill testified as a general practitioner from Tremonton. (V.4, p. 189). He 
treated the plaintiff prior to the accident and knew of no prior injuries. (P. 195,1. 25). 
Prior to the accident she had been in good health. (P. 196,1. 11). After the day of the 
accident, and up until October of 1997, the doctor can recall no conversations with plaintiff 
regarding ongoing pain. (P. 204,1. 3). Dr. Merrill testified that a history of a ripping and 
tearing sound in the neck is unusual. (P. 204,1. 25). He indicated that he had made 
undocumented house calls to the plaintiffs home. Dr. Merrill believed the October 
complications where a result of the motor vehicle accident. (P. 217,1. 25). After visiting 
the plaintiff on February 28, 1997, immediately following the motor vehicle accident he 
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told the plaintiff to come back if she needed to, the plaintiff never returned until October 
19, 1997. (P. 221,1. 3). Dr. Merrill continued to treat the plaintiff, and never told her not 
to work but to change her work habits. (P. 226,1. 3). 
The plaintiff, Mrs. Merry weather, related her employment history as a nurse. (V. 6, 
ps. 12-15). Mrs. Merryweather testified that she told defendant's father and the 
investigating police officer at the accident scene that her neck hurt. (Ps. 30-33). As to an 
implant device, Mrs. Merryweather testified she intended to go ahead with a "simulator." 
Mrs. Merryweather did not discuss a pump. (P. 56). Mrs. Merryweather did not discuss 
her plans for future medical treatment. Mrs. Merryweather was aware the accident was 
reported as "non-injury." (P. 79,1. 10). 
A medical exam was conducted at the request of the defendant by Dr. Scott Knorp. 
Dr. Knorp, after reviewing plaintiffs medical records and examining plaintiff, concluded 
that the events surrounding the severe neck pain in October of 1997 and subsequent 
ongoing problems were not related to the motor vehicle accident and that the plaintiff did 
not suffer from any disability therefrom. (V. 7, ps. 15-23). 
Course of proceedings. Injury selection, Mr. Tarns was excused for cause to which 
defendant objected. The entire episode is related in the body of the brief. A verdict was 
rendered in the amount of $1,300,568.00. (R. 705). The jury awarded $13,000.00 in past 
medical damages, $115,568.00 in future medical damages, $240,000.00 in past and future 
earnings, and $32,000.00 in general damages. Thereafter, a motion for a new trial was 
made. (R. 716). The trial court ordered supplemental briefing on the motion for a new 
trial. (R. 837). Ultimately, however, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial, and 
the final order was entered on March 27, 2001. (R. 1141). Thereafter, defendant filed its 
notice of appeal April 17, 2001. (R.l 154). A copy of the judgment and special verdict are 
attached as Addendum A. Copies of the rulings relative to the new trial motion are 
attached as Addendum B. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court must be reversed and the defendant given a new trial. The defendant 
was a victim of an unfair trial both by the trial court's erroneous rulings and failure to 
remedy prejudicial situations. This appeal presents this court with a precedential decision 
which will establish how cases are tried in the state of Utah. 
Defendant was prejudiced by plaintiffs unfair surprise evidence at trial, since the 
defendant had already committed to a position regarding plaintiffs lost wage claim in 
opening statement. Heading into trial, defendant had a strong argument against plaintiffs 
claim for future lost wages. Upon reviewing plaintiffs tax returns, plaintiff had actually 
been promoted to a job in which paid her more money. Unbeknownst to defendant, 
plaintiff was demoted at her job shortly before trial. Although plaintiffs demotion was 
therefore known to the plaintiff and her counsel before the commencement of trial, such 
demotion was not revealed to defendant until the trial was well underway. 
Last minute disclosure of surprise evidence has long been disfavored by the courts. 
Where the defense reasonably relied upon the information disclosed during the discovery 
phase of the case, particularly tax returns which showed an increase in income, not a 
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decrease, a mistrial or new trial should have been granted. Such trial by ambush is 
considered abhorrent by the courts. A review of the transcript shows that plaintiffs 
knowledge of the demotion occurred before trial and that, in essence, a well laid trap was 
thus set for the defendant. Having the transcripts in hand, one can see the manner in which 
the ambush is laid. Only when the witnesses were on the stand, and shortly before the 
foundational witnesses would testify, was the defendant advised of this new evidence. 
The prejudice suffered by the defendant was not something the trial court could 
undo. Even if the trial court attempted to instruct the jury, which it did not, defendant's 
counsel had already committed to a position in opening statements. It would appear to the 
jury that defendant's counsel was wrong and advocated a position which was not true. 
Thus, the prejudice could not be remedied. 
Inappropriate and prejudicial statements by plaintiffs counsel also warrant a new 
trial. A new trial is warranted by the failure of the trial court to tell the jury where the 
defendant was. Defendant Callister was serving as a missionary in Brazil. While the 
defendant consented to move forward with the trial in the absence of the defendant, the 
trial court should have told the jury where Mr. Callister was. When the trial court indicated 
it would not tell the jury where the defendant was, defendant moved for a continuance. 
The overwhelming prejudice is highlighted by the fact that plaintiff moved the court to 
manacle the defendant into only saying that the defendant was out of the country. After 
applying these restrictions, plaintiff went on in numerous instances to show her affiliation 
with a predominant religion in the state. As a final straw, after insuring that no response 
could be forth coming, in rebuttal argument at the close of the trial plaintiffs counsel then 
inappropriately surmised for the jury why the defendant was not present and wrongly 
inferred that the absence was designed by defense counsel. 
Further, the statements and comments by plaintiffs counsel require a new trial. 
Plaintiffs counsel repeatedly attacked defendant's counsel. Many courts have held that 
similar comments as those made by plaintiffs counsel warrant a reversal. Utah case law 
supports the conclusion that a new trial must be granted. Plaintiffs counsel fiirther went 
on to insert his personal opinions in the trial, which personal opinions not only violate the 
Utah Rules of Personal Conduct, but also case law on the issue. Lastly, all of these 
arguments were designed to have the jury base its verdict on the basis of sympathy or 
prejudice, and particularly the inflammatory remarks of Plaintiff s counsel. Plaintiffs 
counsel inferred plaintiffs inpecuniosity by asking the jury "Who is going to pay." 
Next, the trial court should have granted the defendant a directed verdict since the 
evidence presented does not support the verdict. Particularly, the evidence presented by 
plaintiffs witness David Rollins cannot support the verdict since such evidence was 
inadmissable under both the rules of evidence regarding experts as well as State v. 
Rimmasch and its progeny. Instead of testifying that the plaintiff would suffer certain 
damages, the expert witness' testimony was only that the plaintiff might suffer such 
damages and plaintiff should have "access" to such damages. Severe prejudice was 
suffered by defendant in this regard. 
Except for the testimony of Dr. Rollins, there is no other basis within the evidence 
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for the jury to conclude such damages were warranted. Of the jury verdict of 1.3 million 
dollars, over $750,000.00 of that verdict is attributable to these future medical expenses. 
In response to defendant's objections, the trial court simply indicated that defendant could 
attack the conclusions in cross examination. However, the proper issue before the court 
was admissibility, not the weight of evidence that could be attacked on cross. Thus, the 
defendant suffered great prejudice by having this evidence admitted. The jury clearly 
based their decision upon that evidence. Therefore, a new trial must be granted. 
Further, the trial court erred by allowing plaintiff to call a witness to rebut the 
testimony elicited from a defense witness on cross examination. Rebuttal evidence has 
been defined as evidence which refutes, modifies or explains an opponent's evidence. In 
the present circumstances the evidence elicited by the plaintiff was then rebutted by further 
evidence offered by plaintiff. Evidence first introduced by cross examination cannot be 
considered evidence presented by the opponent's case in chief. State v. Barney. 681 P.2d 
1230, 1231 (Utah 1984). It is therefore improper to allow plaintiff to call a rebuttal witness 
to evidence that plaintiff had himself elicited and can fully have anticipated. Where the 
plaintiff can reasonably have anticipated the evidence, that evidence should have been put 
on, if relevant and at all, in plaintiffs case in chief. 
Lastly, the trial court erroneously excused juror Tarns, which prejudiced defendant 
by effectively giving the plaintiff more peremptory challenges than the defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICED BY PLAINTIFF'S UNFAIR SURPRISE 
EVIDENCE 
Defendant was prejudiced by plaintiffs surprise evidence regarding a demotion 
since defendant had already committed to a position regarding plaintiffs lost wage claim in 
opening statement. Heading into trial, defendant had a strong argument against plaintiffs 
claim for future lost wages. In his report tendered during discovery, plaintiffs 
rehabilitation expert, David Rollins, testified that plaintiffs injuries would require ongoing 
treatment for the rest of year life and would result in a yearly wage loss to plaintiff during 
the rest of her working years. Based on that testimony, plaintiffs economist prepared a 
report indicating that plaintiff would suffer lifetime out of pocket expenses, including both 
wage loss and ongoing medical expenses, between 1.25 million and 1.75 million dollars. 
The problem with these projections, and thus the credibility of plaintiff s experts, was the 
plaintiffs income in the year prior to trial had actually increased beyond her pre-accident 
income, severely mitigating the equated projections made by plaintiffs experts. This fact 
undercut the credibility of plaintiff s experts, and also served as evidence of future earning 
capacity, as well as her functional capacity. 
Unbeknownst to defendant, plaintiff was demoted at her job the day before trial. 
She would be receiving less income and less hours than she had before the accident. Later, 
plaintiffs supervisor would testify that plaintiffs poor job performance was related to her 
physical limitations and narcotic addiction arising from the accident. 
Although the plaintiffs demotion was known to plaintiffs counsel before trial, such 
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demotion was not revealed to defendant until three days into trial, and significantly, after 
defense counsel's opening statement. Plaintiffs sole aim was to conduct trial by ambush. 
The defense made a motion in limine seeking to prevent the introduction of this evidence, 
or in the alternative, a continuance so that further discovery could be had to explore this 
last minute development. The trial court denied the motions. 
Last minute disclosures have long been disfavored by the courts. The Utah 
Supreme Court held: "The purpose [of Utah's discovery rules] is to... remove elements of 
surprise or trickery so that the parties and the court can determine the facts and resolve the 
issues, as directly, fairly, and expeditiously as possible." Ellis v. Gilbert. 429 P.2d 39, 40 
(Utah 1967). Rule 59(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "surprise, 
which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against," is grounds for a new trial. Here, 
evidence of plaintiff s demotion came as a surprise to the defense. Plaintiff had been 
deposed prior to trial and the fact that the plaintiff would be demoted or was even being 
considered for demotion was never mentioned. The defense reasonably relied upon the 
information disclosed during the discovery phase of this case, particularly plaintiffs tax 
returns which showed an increase in income, not a decrease. 
Obviously, the defense could not have prepared for or guarded against an event that 
occurred shortly before trial. The evidence of plaintiff s demotion being sprung on the 
defense three days into trial justifies a new trial. Even extraordinary prudence on the part 
of the defendant could not have guarded against this information. 
Such a trial by ambush is considered abhorrent by the federal courts as well. 
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Indeed, the federal courts have held that one of the main purposes of the amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (a model for the Utah Rules) was to permit broad 
discovery in an effort to avoid "trial-by-ambush." Martino v. Baker. 179 F.R.D. 588, 589 
(D. Colo. 1998). 
Royalty Petroleum Co. v. Arkla. Inc., 129 F.R.D. 674 (W.D. Okla. 1990) presents a 
factual situation similar to the present case. In Royalty Petroleum, the defense filed a 
supplemental interrogatory response on the eve of trial pertaining to conversations relevant 
to the action, including a conversation involving plaintiffs counsel. Upholding the trial 
court's decision to exclude the evidence, the Royalty Petroleum court stated: 
The problem posed by defendant's untimely interrogatories submission is clear. 
Based on the previous deposition testimony of Medlin, coupled with the initial 
interrogatory response filed by Arkla, plaintiffs counsel, Goresen, had no 
expectation that on the eve of trial Arkla would assert the existence of a "one on 
one" conversation with Goresen involving a critical issue in the case. This is, at 
bottom, at least a trial-by-ambush tactic which simply cannot be permitted in 
modern federal practice. 
Royalty Petroleum. 129 F.R.D. at 678. See also Shelak v. White Motor Co.. 581 F.2d 
1155, 1159 (5th Cir. 1978). 
Similar to Royalty Petroleum, the defense in this case relied upon previous 
information garnered through discovery to form the entire defense strategy to plaintiffs 
claims of significant future damages. Defendant had no expectation, nor warning, that 
plaintiff would be demoted shortly before trial. In fact, the situation presented in this case 
is even more egregious than Royalty Petroleum. Here, the information regarding the 
plaintiffs demotion was not revealed to the defendant until three days into trial, after 
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defense counsel had already made opening statements and cross-examined other witnesses. 
Such trial by ambush tactics cannot be countenanced by this court. 
Defendant was provided plaintiffs medical and employment records even after the 
discovery cut off in this case. Plaintiff was not promoted to her higher paying 
administrative position until after her deposition had been taken. Plaintiffs problems 
regarding her new position did not fully crystalize until after the discovery cut off. Any 
claims by the plaintiff that defendant could have somehow garnered this information 
simply is untenable. 
In the initial pleading opposing a new trial, plaintiff repeatedly asserted that neither 
plaintiffs experts nor plaintiffs counsel were aware of the demotion until the trial had 
already started. (R. 747, 748, 763). However, a review of the trial transcript shows that 
plaintiff did have such superior knowledge. Plaintiff clearly understood the claim she was 
making as she entered trial. Having the transcripts of the trial in hand, one can see the 
manner in which the ambush was laid. In opening statements, plaintiffs counsel intimated 
to a reduction or change of working conditions. Of course, it was not until a week later 
that defense counsel and the court became aware of the totality of the changes which the 
plaintiffs counsel spoke of in his opening argument. Plaintiffs counsel stated: 
What Mr. Jex will testify to is she's having a very difficult time. She's having a 
very difficult time doing this job. In fact, they keep moving her from job to job and 
changing her duties and making them smaller and smaller. Mr. Jex when asked if he 
could hire her to be full-time administrator and work in that position, if she can't do 
hands on nursing any more, does she have the wherewithall, the ability and strength, 
to do full-time administrative, his answer was no. She, through Dr. Ashbum, has 
recently cut her hours down to 32 hours a week. She has an interesting job, where 
you have 32 hours to do shift work and also on call work, which means the hospital 
may or may not need you, so they pay you like 12 per cent of your wage, two or 
three bucks an hour, as long as you stay in Tremonton, or as long as you're 15 or 20 
minutes away from the hospital. If they have an emergency, you get a pittance, but 
at least that way the hospital is staffed. So she's down to 32 hours a week in this 
new accommodated job. 
(V.l, p. 162, Is. 4 - 23). Of course at the time this statement was made, defense counsel 
had no idea what plaintiffs counsel was talking about. This statement shows that 
plaintiffs counsel at that time was intimately familiar with the facts of the demotion. 
Later, when confronted by an allegation by defendant that an ambush had occurred, 
plaintiffs counsel alleged that he did not know that a change in job led to a reduction of 
income. In light of the opening statement, this assertion appears hollow. 
The Court: 
Mr. Harris: 
The Court: 
Mr. Ivie: 
The Court: 
Mr. Harris: 
The Court: 
Mr. Harris: 
The Court: 
Mr. Harris: 
The Court: 
Mr. Harris: 
When was Mr. Ivie advised of this for the first time. 
I gave it to him yesterday. 
Was that the first time he had notice of her change in employment 
status. 
I would like a record; yesterday at noon lunch break. 
You are telling me that her employment status changed as of 
September 18? 
Correct. When Dr. Randall and I met with Mr. Jex on Monday, that's 
when he informed that she was no long 40 hours, that they had created 
this 24 hour plus job a week. 
When was she told about it. 
When she was told. 
When was the plaintiff told about it. 
Sometime in September as they were going though [sic] and making 
this effective. 
I assume before you were. 
Yes, I had, and I stated in my opening argument that changes had been 
made and she was in labor and delivery. I didn't know if that was part 
of the full-time or how that all worked out, but meeting with Mr. Jex 
on Monday, that's when we found out the breadth and extent of it. I 
don't see it any different than a medical bill or medical record or 
employment record. 
(V.5,p. 12,1. 18 -p . 13,1. 18). 
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Accordingly, giving plaintiff every benefit of the doubt, the information constituted 
a surprise for both parties. Apparently, acknowledging the prejudice upon the defendant, 
plaintiffs counsel then attempted to argue that he did not know of the change in job 
assignment until Monday, September 25th. (V.5, p. 17,1. 12). Looking back, however, 
plaintiff and her counsel knew of the financial import of this change from the beginning. 
Plaintiffs counsel stated in opening statement: 
What we will do is show you the before, what her ability was, what kind of shifts 
she could pull. All of her on call stuff, all of her home health care. We relate that to 
now, with the 32- hour-a-week restriction and those kinds of things. 
And there's a differential between what she can earn. Thirty-two hours a week is a 
day a week less working for the rest of her work life. The average work life— 
some bean counter somewhere calculated how long women work and how long men 
work. The average work life for women, and I don't remember what the report says 
exactly, but its in the high fifties or low sixties. So you run that out and do the same 
kind of thing. 
(V.l,p. 166,1. 17, - p . 167,1.4). 
For plaintiff to claim after the fact they did not understand the financial impact of 
this change until later in trial appears disingenuous. The record clearly reflects that 
defense did not know about this change until, at the earliest, lunch break on September 26, 
2000. However, prior to letting the defense know, plaintiff unleashed its ambush on the 
unsuspecting defense. 
Mr. Harris: I want to state this as a hypothetical that Mr. Jex will talk about the in 
the morning, but I want you to assume that Rhonda's administrative 
[position] at the hospital being the number three person in the hospital 
was terminated as of this month, and I want you to you assume — 
Mr. Ivie: Your Honor, I will object that this assumes facts not in evidence in 
which I suspect if it is offered in evidence may be considered 
speculative and thus should not be the subject of a hypothetical until it 
is actually ruled admissible. 
Mr. Harris: Mr. Jex will be here tomorrow to lay all this out. He isn't here yet. 
The Court: I don't know whether— 
Mr. Harris: It isn't speculative, it's happened. 
The Court: Has his deposition been taken? 
Mr. Harris: No. Your Honor, it's not speculative. It's a fact, it's happened. 
The Court: Well, you are suggesting some things that we haven't yet heard in 
evidence. 
Mr. Harris: You have do that by hypothetical. I think it's the only way I can do it. 
Mr. Ivie: Yes, and a proper objection is it assumes facts not in evidence. Now, 
if I had a reasonable certainty that a specific fact would be admitted in 
evidence, but at this point it hasn't been offered, and I have reason to 
suspect that it would not be admissible. So until we actually have an 
opportunity to hear that fact, I will object that it assumes facts not in 
evidence. 
The Court: Perhaps we need to excuse the jury for a minute and make an adequate 
record here. 
Mr. Harris: Sure. 
(V.4,p.91,1.7-p.92, l . 12). 
Thus, the ambush took place in its original volley prior to the lunch break on 
September 26, 2000, (V.4, p. 116 (lunch break)). While such an ambush is prejudicial 
under any circumstance, it is even more so when it takes place in front of the jury with no 
notice whatsoever to the defendant. 
Under Rule 59, the lack of this evidence to be timely disclosed warrants a new trial. 
Such evidence was material evidence to the issue of wage loss. This evidence was not 
cumulative of any other evidence in the trial. Such surprises always warrant a new trial. 
The only circumstances where a new trial is not warranted for such an ambush is where 
another party could have guarded against the surprise. Powers v. Genes Building 
Materials, Inc.. 567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1977). 
The fact of plaintiff s demotion and the reasons for such demotion given at the trial 
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affect not only the issue of lost wages as an item of damage, which issue alone warrants a 
new trial, but the issue is also inflamatory as to the plaintiffs claim for general damages. 
It is simply unjust to sustain the trial court in allowing a verdict to stand under these 
circumstances. According, the trial court abused its discretion, and a new trial must be 
granted. 
II. INAPPROPRIATE AND PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS BY PLAINTIFF'S 
COUNSEL WARRANT A NEW TRIAL 
Defendant maintains that comments of plaintiff s counsel in opening statement and 
in closing argument warrant a new trial. Three issues are herein presented all of which 
cause prejudice to the defendant: (1) the failure of the trial court to tell the jury exactly 
where the defendant was, (2) improper arguments by plaintiffs counsel during closing 
arguments regarding the location of the defendant, and (3) an impermissible plea to poverty 
in opening statement. 
A new trial is warranted upon the failure of the trial court to tell the jury 
exactly where the defendant was. At the time of the trial, defendant Callister was serving 
as a missionary for the LDS church in Brazil. (R. 1175, p. 69,1. 17). While defendant 
agreed to move forward with the trial in the absence of the defendant, the trial court should 
have allowed the defendant from the beginning of the trial to explain where Mr. Callister's 
absence. The trial court recognized the prejudice which could confront the defendant. "I 
think it would be unfair to not give an explanation. I don't want to leave in their minds 
where is the guy? Is he not interested, locked up, whaf s going on. That would be unfair." 
(R. 1175, p.70, Is. 22-25). 
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However, after consideration, the trial court sanctioned exactly that unfair event. 
Not allowing the jury to know where the defendant was prejudiced the defendant in 
allowing the jury to speculate as to Mr. Callister's location, improperly inferring that while 
the jury had to spend two weeks of their life listening to the trial that Mr. Callister was not 
interested in the litigation or its outcome. Finally, plaintiffs counsel, after laboring to keep 
the location of the defendant a secret from the jury, argued and testified in closing 
argument as to the reason for defendant's absence. 
Interestingly, plaintiff claimed that to let the jury know where defendant was would 
unduly prejudice the plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged such religious reference would create 
sympathy for the defendant. (R. 841, p. 22, Is. 15-19; R. 1175, p. 71). However, during 
the course of trial, plaintiff showed no hesitancy in repeatedly advising the jury of her 
connection with her church with vernacular terms such as "young women" and "ward," 
leaving the unmistakable impression as to her religious affiliation. 
While the defendant was restricted from making even the allusion to defendant 
being on a church affiliated mission, Brad Merryweather testified that Rhonda played in a 
softball league sponsored by the "church." (V. 2, p. 46,1. 18). In regards to the sporting 
activities, Brad Merryweather explained: 
Question: Volleyball, I think he said, was that a casual thing, or was that a 
league as well? 
Answer: That was church. She would coach volleyball and basketball for the 
young women. 
(V. 2, p. 47, Is. 9-10). Plaintiff herself testified that she did not play sports in high school, 
"but I did it for church activities." (V. 6, p. 8, Is. 13-14). She obviously expressed herself 
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as a church going individual when asked about problems with laxatives and identified one 
of the problems occurring at church. (V. 6, p. 68,1. 23). Mrs. Merry weather indicated that 
her city league was broken up into "church zones." (V. 6, p. 18,1. 3). In discussing who 
she had discussed her inability to play Softball with, plaintiff answered: "Fae Skinner. Our 
wards just had gotten split so there like the new year or two before." (V. 6, p. 117, Is. 20-
21). Again at the same time plaintiff indicated that the leagues were broken up into ward 
divisions. (V. 6, p. 117,1. 3). All of this was done in contrast to a defendant who only in 
closing argument could allude a single time to where the defendant actually was. 
In plaintiffs rebuttal argument, plaintiffs counsel claimed that the defense was 
actually hiding Mr. Callister. Plaintiffs counsel argued: 
I submit to you there's a reason why Mr. I vie chose to try this case with his client 
over seas in Brazil. His experts argue with his client. His experts think his client is 
full of beans. His experts all say he was wrong. It doesn't help him to put on a guy 
with a short hair cut on that witness stand and have me get out his deposition and 
say how fast were you going, Carson? 
(V. 8, p. 84, Is. 18-24). In effect, knowing full well the defense had asked for a 
continuance to allow Mr. Callister to return home, plaintiff misrepresents to the jury the 
desire of the defense not to have Mr. Callister present. Again, plaintiffs counsel argues: "I 
submit to you that the reason Carson isn't here, when he will be home by the end of the 
year, there is a reason why he isn't here." (V. 8, p. 87, Is. 9-12). Not only is the disparate 
treatment unfair, but the misrepresentations and improper arguments of plaintiff s counsel 
in closing argument warrant a new trial alone. 
Plaintiffs counsel's statements in closing argument warrant a new trial. The 
only remedy for the improper statements of plaintiff s counsel is a new trial. To reward the 
plaintiffs counsel in the present matter by not reversing, while acknowledging the 
impropriety of statements, provides the defendant with no remedy whatsoever, and invites 
the same conduct in the future if attorneys think their only reprimand will be a slap on the 
hand. A new trial is warranted where an attorney's "comments" constitute misconduct 
when they call the juror's attention to matters not proper for their consideration and when 
the comments have a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the jury by significantly 
influencing its verdict. State v. Jimenez. 2001 UT App. 68, f 9, 21 P.3d 1142. 
Attacks on opposing counsel. Initially, it should be pointed out that plaintiffs 
counsel asked the jury to do exactly what they should not. Particularly, plaintiffs counsel 
asked the jury not to compare the relative merits of the case, but to compare the case in 
terms of their attorneys. Plaintiffs counsel argued: 
Now, when it comes down to it, the thing you're going to discuss in there is did Mr. 
Harris prove Rhonda's case? Did he tell you the truth? Did Mr. Harris try to 
confuse you or miss lead you? Did Mr. Harris meet his burden as set forth in those 
instructions? Were Mr. Harris' experts qualified to know what they were talking 
about? And then, the reverse of that, you have to ask the same questions about Mr. 
lvie. Did he tell you the truth in this case? Did he attempt to mislead you in this 
case? Did he attempt to confuse you in this case? Were his witnesses qualified? 
Did his witnesses bring into this court any biases or history or connection with the 
defense firms of the state? 
(V. 8, p. 13, Is. 4-15). Thereafter, plaintiffs counsel attacks defense counsel in following 
particulars: 
I submit to you that the defense in this case has been an orchestrated attempt to 
mislead and confuse you with half truths. I mean, I love that statement, what's the 
matter with Mr. Harris. He keeps asking these people what information did they get 
or not get. The experts all said they had plenty of information to come up with an 
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opinion. Well, ya, but not on this case. Not on the facts of this case. Why confuse 
them with the facts? Why give Mr. France the facts, medical or the physical facts, 
from any of the witnesses? Sure they have plenty of information to come up with an 
opinion, but it has nothing to do with this case. 
(V.8, p. 86, Is. 15-25). Plaintiff continued to attack defendant's counsel: 
That wasn't news to him. For him to stand up and read that one little snippet— he 
just read one page. Didn't Ms. Fenstermaker give him the whole deposition? Does 
he not have all the information, like he didn't give France and everybody else all of 
the information? It makes me crazy. 
If you have all of the facts, the facts are available, and you think you witnesses are 
any good, why not give them the facts? Why not have their opinions be based on 
every thing out there like Dr. Limpert had? Like Chad Merrill, like Dr. Smith, like 
Dr. Ashburn? We didn't hide anything from them. The reason you don't do that is 
because you don't like the facts. 
(V.8, p. 87,1. 24 - p. 88, Ins. 2-10.) 
He's in his office trying to do some kind of effort to suppress what is already 
known. What Mr. Ivie would know if he had read the deposition of Teresa. 
It's the same kinda thing, if you don't like the facts, misquote them, hide them, 
change them, enter into a gentleman's agreement not to have them. Dr. Knorpp's 
conduct in this case isn't a lot different than what has gone on otherwise. 
(V.8, p. 89, Is. 2-10.). 
Courts universally recognize that such comments constitute reversible error. In 
Commonwealth v. Hawlev, 401 N.E.2d 827 (Mass. 1980), a prosecutor accused defense 
counsel of being an active participant, and perhaps leader, of a plot to commit perjury. The 
appellate court reversed while stating there was no evidence to permit such an inference 
and that such inflammatory remarks were prejudicial. Likewise, in Missouri K.T.R. Co. of 
Texas v. Ridgwav, 191 F.2d 363, 369 (C.A. 8 1951), plaintiffs counsel stated that defense 
counsel was "characterized by hypocrisy, fraud, dishonesty and buffoonery. They sought 
to conceal evidence, disobeyed court orders, resorted to...stalling maneuver^]...and 
attempted to make the administration of justice as difficult as possible." The Ridgway 
court held that "counsel must keep within the evidence and may not employ language not 
justified by the record, or resort to uncalled for personal abuse, and it is highly 
reprehensible for counsel in argument to use, without supporting evidence, language 
implying facts have been suppressed by opposing counsel." Id. at 369-370. 
Even the courts of Utah have held that it is improper to comment on a defendant's 
strategy and use of evidence for the apparent purpose of inflaming the jury. State v. 
Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 529 (Utah App. 1997). Many cases reach similar conclusions. 
Griffith v. Shamrock Village, Inc.. 94 So.2d 854, 857 (Fla. 1957)(case reversed where 
counsel suggested that opposing party and witnesses committed perjury and collusion); 
Lewis v. Cotton Belt Rout - St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co., 576 N.E.2d 918, 978 (111. 
App. 5 Dist. 1991)(it is improper in closing argument to impugn the honesty of the 
opposing attorney and witnesses and to ascribe bad motives to the opposing party). 
Personal opinions of plaintiff s counsel. Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(e) 
states in pertinent part: 
A lawyer shall not: 
(e) in trial...assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a 
witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justice of a cause, the credibility of a 
witness [or] the culpability of the civil litigant[.] 
In reviewing the witness called by the defense in this matter, plaintiffs counsel remarked: 
"It makes me crazy." (V. 8, p. 88,1. 4). Plaintiffs counsel thus improperly commented on 
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the veracity of the witnesses, which is the prerogative of the jury and not counsel. In Silva 
v. Nightingale, 619 So.2d 4, 5 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1993), the court stated that, "[I]t is 
axiomatic that a lawyer's expression of his personal opinion as to credibility of a witness, 
or of his personal knowledge of facts in the case, is fundamentally improper." In the 
present matter plaintiffs counsel made the improper assertion that defense witnesses had 
based their opinions on facts having "nothing to do with this case." (V.8, p. 86, Is. 18-25). 
In Kroger Grocery & Banking Co. v. Stuart. 164 F.2d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 1947), defense 
counsel improperly remarked that plaintiffs counsel had "tried everything except the 
facts." The Stuart court ruled this remark had "nothing... to do with the merits of the 
controversy... and was improper and offensive and the refusal of the court to direct the jury 
to disregard it was error."2 Id. 
As stated above, plaintiffs counsel insinuated a sinister motive to the decision of 
defendant to try the case without Mr. Callister being present. Mr. Harris personally opined 
as to what Carson's testimony would have been had he been present. In State v. Pabst 996 
P.2d 321, 326 (Kan. 2000), the court, citing the Kansas Rules of Professional conduct, 
stated that an attorney should not assert personal knowledge. Silva v. Nightingale, 619 
So.2d at 5, recognized: "It is improper for an attorney to take on during argument the guise 
of an impeaching witness." This is essentially what plaintiffs counsel was doing by 
stating what Carson would say in his testimony. 
Improper attack based on fees. Finally, plaintiffs counsel improperly attacked 
2In the present matter, no curative instructions were given by the court. 
Dr. Knorpp and Dr. Weight on the basis of their fees. In Commonwealth v. Shelly. 373 
N.E.2d 951, 954 (Mass. 1978), a prosecutor contended in closing arguments that defense's 
expert witnesses were "bought" because they were paid fees. The prosecutor stated, "Are 
they going to hire somebody and bring him into court if they are not going to testify to what 
they want them to testify to?" Id. at 954. The Shelly court held it was improper and unfair 
to urge an inference that defendant purchased testimony when no facts in evidence 
supported such an inference. Id. Similarly, plaintiffs counsel in the present case stated 
that Dr. North had "104,000 reasons a year to tell you things" and Dr. Weight "has made 
over a million dollars peddling his clinical psychology degree before juries and for 90% of 
defense at least." There was no evidence before the jury that the opinions were fabricated 
and not within the professional realm of the witness. 
In LaRusso v. Pollack, 449 N.Y.S.2d 794 (N.Y.A.D. 1982), defense counsel 
improperly implied that plaintiffs expert witnesses were bought. "I paid the thousand, you 
voice my theories," stated defense counsel in closing. Id. at 795. The LaRusso court ruled 
this was inflammatory and reversed the judgment and granted a new trial. The same results 
should obtain here. All of the above stated comments were highly inflammatory.3 In 
addition to violating rules of professional conduct, the statements of plaintiff s counsel 
violate all rules of evidence as plaintiffs counsel is not under oath, his opinion is irrelevant 
and prejudicial, and such comments are not admissible. Given the multiplicity of occasions 
3Venning v. Roe, 616 So.2d 604 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1993)(counsel accused 
opposing party of committing fraud on the court by employing a doctor who "prostituted" 
himself). 
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where this rule is transgressed, the only appropriate remedy is the granting of a new trial. 
While cross-examining a witness as to whether he does more work for defendants than 
plaintiffs, defendant's witness stated: 
Witness: I-I- as you well know, I do much more defense work. 
Mr. Harris: I do know. 
(V.6, p. 166,1. 24-p. 167,1. 1). At that point, the trial court sustained an objection, and 
asked counsel to restrict himself to asking questions. Apparently, this admonition could 
not be heeded. When Dr. Weight indicated he did not talk to any family member because 
plaintiffs counsel "had instructed them not to talk to me," plaintiffs counsel testified: 
"That's correct--that's absolutely correct." (V. 6, p. 231,1. 20). Again, plaintiffs 
counsel was admonished just to ask questions. 
After an answer by witness Paul France, plaintiffs counsel testified: 
Mr. Harris: That's right. Because it's my job to get to the bottom of— of your 
opinions and see if they hold water. 
Mr. Ivie: Objection, your Honor. 
The Court: Sustained. Counsel you are not under oath. Ask questions. 
(V. 6, p. 242, Is. 3-7).4 
In attacking counsel and defendant's witnesses, plaintiffs counsel wrongfully stated 
"I don't like these guys. You can tell I don't. I feel that—." (V. 8, p. 95,1. 9). An 
objection was made and the parties were asked to approach the bench. At no time did the 
trial court give any curative instruction. In reality, curative instructions are of little use 
4Plaintiff s counsel requested to voir dire a witness during direct, and began his 
examination by stating to a witness: "That's a nice looking suit today—." (V. 7, p. 18,1. 
10), where upon plaintiffs counsel even acknowledged that it was a comment and not a 
question that he was asking. Id. at 1. 12. 
1A 
when inflammatory comments are made; the prejudice has already been done. 
There can only be a remedy and sanction of reversal in this case. To sustain the 
present verdict is to allow an unfair trial to stand. To admonish counsel in future cases to 
not engage in like activity is to highlight that there is no real remedy or penalty. In short, 
unless the court reverses, this court will invite similar actions in future cases. 
Improper plea to poverty. Defendant stipulated to the fault. (V. 1, p. 126). 
Accordingly, "the rule is well established that where liability is admitted, evidence going 
only to liability, in the absence of claim of punitive damages, is not admissible." Jones v. 
Carvell 641 P.2d 105, 111 (Utah 1982). With fault admitted, "accountability" is 
irrelevant. During opening statement, plaintiffs attorney referred to expected evidence of 
exorbitant claims of lifetime medical expenses. Plaintiffs counsel then states: "Well, she 
says, okay, but is this expensive. Who is going to pay for all of this pain management." 
(P. 152, Is. 21-23). "Now, she asks who pays for all of this medication, who is going to 
pay that I can't work full time, who's going to pay for this stimulator device?" (P. 153, Is. 
13-15). "That's why she asked who is going to pay for all this stuff." (P. 166,1. 5). 
Defendant objected to plaintiff s improper argument. (V. l ,p. 138). No curative 
instruction was given. The court's admonition to refrain from argument was wholly 
ignored. 
Of course, it is axiomatic that opening statement should not include argument. State 
v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1254 (Utah 1988). It has long been the law in Utah that pleas 
plainly designed to elicit sympathy or to inspire passion or prejudice are improper and 
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should not be allowed. Eager v. Willis. 410 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Utah 1966). In Donahue v. 
Intermountain Health Care. 748 P.2d 1067 (Utah 1987), the court upheld a trial court's 
grant of a new trial because of improper remarks designed to "appeal to the social or 
economic prejudices of the jury." The court found improper and prejudicial an argument 
which stated: "[I]t is an awesome— it is an awesome thing that you are being asked to do. 
In our system, a small, but injured party, is allowed, through the jury system, to take on the 
strong and the mighty, and have an even chance of success." Plaintiffs counsel's also 
argued that suing IHC is "a little like suing mother nature in this community...." The 
supreme court held counsel's improper comments could have prejudiced the jury and 
caused them to render an inflated verdict. Id. at 1068. 
The exact inverse argument was made in the present case, inviting the same 
prejudicial result. The plaintiff waived the issue of relative poverty before the jury's eyes 
asking them to base their verdict on sympathy and thus render an inflated verdict. The 
parties stipulated that $42,421.26 had been incurred and that those expenses were 
reasonable for the treatment rendered. (V. 6, p. 6,1. 5). Plaintiff highlighted this 
stipulation in closing argument. (V. 8, p. 34,1. 18). Due to this stipulation, the amount of 
these damages were fixed. Nevertheless, the jury awarded $13,000.00 or 30% of those 
damages. On the other hand, the jury awarded $750,000.00 in future medical expenses. 
The jury so acted even in light of the fact there was no evidence that those medical 
expenses would be incurred to a certainty. Thus, on its face the verdict appears to have 
been simply inflated to a large round number. 
Federal courts have also held that reference to the wealth or poverty of either party 
is improper argument.5 Repeatedly asking the jury who is going to pay in the manner done 
by plaintiffs counsel raised the inference of, and sympathy for, an alleged inability to pay 
those expenses. Other state jurisdictions have held that even a single reference to financial 
condition of litigants or the ability of plaintiff to pay the alleged damages is prejudicial. In 
Lenz v. Julian, 657 N.E. 2d 712, 719 (111. App. 1995) defendant's attorney stated in closing 
argument: "I don't think that its fair that [defendant] Joseph Julian, for the next 50 years 
should have to pay." The Lenz court stated: "To warrant reversal, however, the language 
utilized in a reference to defendant's financial condition must be reasonably understood to 
refer to the financial status of one of the parties and must result in prejudice to the 
complaining party." Id. The court found that the statement was a clear reference to the 
defendant's personal responsibility and lack of ability to pay a judgment. The court found 
it particularly disturbing in light of the fact that defendant's attorney, prior to trial, had 
filed a motion in limine to bar the introduction of evidence showing that the state would 
indemnify the defendant. Thus, the court stated: "Aside from being improper, the 
statement complained of, was presumably false. The comment could only serve to appeal 
to the sympathy of the jury and under the circumstances it constituted reversible error." Id. 
Those same exact circumstances can be found in the present case. The clear 
5Garcia v. Sam Tinkslev Trucking, Inc., 708 F.2d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1983)(citing 
United States v. StahL 616 F.2d 30, 33 (2nd Cir. 1980); Draper v. Air Co.. Inc.. 580 F.2d 
91, 95 (3rd Cir. 1978); Eisenhauer v. Berger. 431 F.2d 833, 837 (6 Cir. 1970). See also 
United States v. Soconv Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 239, 60 S. Ct. 811, 851, 84 L.ed. 
1129 (1940)(court held appeals to class prejudice to be highly improper). 
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inference from plaintiffs counsel's comments were that plaintiff suffered from a lack of 
ability to pay for those damages.6 California courts have long held that a showing of 
poverty of the plaintiff is highly prejudicial. In Hoffman v. Brant 421 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 
1966), counsel for defendant stated that the amount demanded would send his client to a 
home for the indigent. The Hoffman court held that the deliberate suggestion of poverty 
was improper and false, since defendant was in fact covered by insurance, and a curative 
instruction did not cure the prejudice. Id- at 429. Likewise, in the present case, any 
instruction by the court does not solve the prejudice. Once the jury is inflamed the 
remainder of the trial remains tainted. The cases cited above are strikingly similar to the 
present case and not only did plaintiffs counsel make reference on serval occasions to 
plaintiffs alleged inability to pay her damages, but the implications made by plaintiffs 
counsel were also false. 
The fact of prejudice is highlighted by the fact that these statements were made by 
plaintiffs counsel and his experts, thus on more than one occasion, and that a large and 
excessive verdict was arrived at. In cases involving improper reference to wealth or 
poverty, courts have held that large or excessive verdicts are an indication of prejudice. 
Garcia. 708 F.2d 519, 522-23 (citing City of Cleveland v. Peter Keiwit Sons. Co.. 624 F.2d 
749, 759 (6th Cir. 1980); Koufakis v. Carvel. 425 F.2d 892, 901-02 (2nd Cir. 1970). The 
instant case clearly resulted in an excessive verdict in light of the injuries sustained by the 
plaintiff, and the questionable causal connection between the subject accident, and 
6Later it would come out that plaintiff had insurance which would cover those 
expenses. Thus, just as in Lenz the presumed inability to pay was fiction. 
plaintiffs ongoing complaints demonstrated by her gaps in treatment. 
The proper remedy for prejudicial attorney misconduct is a new trial. The standard 
for making this determination is whether the errors were "real and substantial and such as 
may reasonably be supposed would affect the result." Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 
734 (Utah 1982)(citations omitted). Here, by commenting that plaintiff wanted to know 
who was going to pay for her lifetime medical expenses, the jury likely inferred that if the 
defendant did not pay for plaintiffs medical expenses that plaintiff would unjustly be left 
with hundreds of thousands of dollars in future medical expenses. This implication was 
known to be false because her medical expenses were covered by health insurance. Second, 
as above stated, the inflated verdict in this matter also is an indication of prejudice. 
HI. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE DEFENDANT A 
DIRECTED VERDICT: THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
The trial court should have directed a verdict for defendant. The evidence brought 
forth in trial does not support the verdict. Defendant made a mition for a directed verdict 
which was denied. (V. 6, p. 121). Defendant's counsel maintained that the relationship 
between the damages claimed in the accident required speculation on the part of the jury, 
that therefore any non-speculative damages were under the amount of the Utah No-Fault 
Acts tort threshold, and defendant was entitled to a directed verdict. 
The evidence before the court simply does not sustain the largest part of the verdict, 
that is, $750,000.00 for future medical expenses. The jury so acted, even in light of the 
fact that there was no evidence that those medical expenses would be incurred to a 
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certainty. In fact, the witnesses did not even testify that they would most likely be 
incurred.7 The only testimony for the plaintiff came from Mr. Rollins, who maintained an 
opinion that the plaintiff should have "access" to vast amounts of money in case she feels 
like having treatment in the future. The following testimony of Dr. Rollins occurred at trial: 
Question: Are you saying she is going to see a neurologist, an orthopod ten 
times? What are you telling the jury? 
Answer: I am just saying that she should have access on suitable and 
appropriate basis to these specialists. 
Question: As a group? 
Answer: No. Sometimes she may in given period of time see only a neurologist 
or only a psychiatrist, or only a podiatrist.8 The idea being that she 
does needs to have access even when the need is there and if she 
doesn't, then have that established and doesn't have the discretionary 
funds to do that, she may not be able to access that service from that 
specialist. 
(V. 5, p. 100, Is. 13-19). In other words, the damages were far more speculative than those 
that had actually been incurred. For these speculative damages, the jury awarded three-
quarters of a million dollars. The verdict is therefore inconsistent on its face and the jury's 
conclusion that only $13,000 out of $42,000 of medical expenses were attributable to the 
accident must be based on a determination that other $29,000 of medical expenses were not 
related to the accident. When comparing these two categories of damages, this court can 
only conclude that the jury misapprehended the evidence and rendered an inconsistent 
verdict. Because Dr. Rawlings' testimony is not sufficiently valid so as to lay the basis for 
7Defendant recognizes that plaintiff attempted to veil the conclusions of his expert 
with broad questions regarding probability, but in light of what the witness actually 
testified to, those broad statements cannot suffice as "magic words." 
8Defendant has found no reference to foot injuries in the remainder of the trial. 
the damages, this court must conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
verdict. The evidence cannot support the verdict because Mr. Rollins' testimony lacked the 
requisite certainty and was inadmissable under State v. Rimmasch. 
Lack of certainty. If the testimony of Mr. Rollins is excluded, then the matter must 
be remanded for a new trial. Without Mr. Rollins' testimony, there is insufficient evidence 
to support the verdict. Even if this court assumes that Mr. Rollins' testimony met the 
standards of admissability, his conclusory statements that his opinion was made to a degree 
of "reasonable rehabilitation probability" cannot form the basis of a damage award. The 
Utah Supreme Court in Robinson v. Hreinson. 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (Utah 1965) 
held: 
For this reason the jury should not be allowed to assess future damages on 
probability, but only such damages as it believes from a preponderance of the 
evidence the plaintiff will with reasonable certainty incur in the future." 
Id. at 125.9 This was not the standard that any of plaintiff s witnesses testified to. Further, 
even though the witnesses claimed to speak in terms of probability, their underlying 
testimony did not reflect that standard. Dr. Ashburn did not testify that plaintiff would 
have the pump for the rest of her life. He indicated that initially a trial for the pump would 
be necessary. Obviously, if the pump failed, the pump, the replacement pumps, and all 
maintenance costs related thereto would not be incurred. 
9cf. Brown v. Johnson, 24 Utah 2d 388, 472 P.2d 942 (Utah 1970). Brown is 
distinguishable because the witness testified the 15% ("15 out of each 100 people ... 
would positively require future surgery") chance of surgery was certain. Further, as 
Justice Henroid points out in his concurrence and dissent, the language in Brown as to 
possibility is obiter dicta. Id. at 946 (Henroid, J. dissenting). 
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Further, plaintiffs claims to future lost wages arise out of a claim that she can no 
longer physically do her job, or in other words, she has a lost earning capacity. "However, 
in order to recover for lost earning capacity, the loss must be proven with 'reasonable 
certainty,' although not 'mathematical certainty.'" The most that any witness on behalf of 
the plaintiff testified to was a "probable" loss of capacity. Up until trial, the plaintiff has 
been working 50-60 hours a week. Accordingly, Mr. Rollins' testimony lacked the 
requisite certainty upon which a jury can rest its verdict. 
Mr. Rollins' testimony was inadmissable. The opinion of an expert is limited by 
the foundation laid for it. Patev v. Lainhart. 1999 UT 31, T|23, 977 P.2d 1193. Conclusions 
of the expert are inadmissable "where an expert witness has not testified to sufficient facts 
on which to base his opinion." Id. (quoting Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328, 1331 
(Utah 1979)). To simply put forth an expert's qualifications is never enough; the 
commensurate foundation must still be laid. State v. Pendergrass, 803 P.2d 1261, 1265 
(Utah App. 1990). Further, where the expert opinion is based upon novel scientific 
principles or techniques, the proponent of the expert testimony must show that the 
conclusions are inherently reliable. State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 1989). 
"Casting the Phillips/Kofford standard in terms of the rubric of rule 702, it can be said that 
evidence not shown to be reliable cannot, as a matter of law, 'assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine the fact in issue' and therefore is inadmissable." 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 397-98. Therefore, "the proponent of scientific evidence that does 
not qualify for judicial notice must make an initial foundational showing that convinces the 
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trial court that the principles or techniques underlying the proffered testimony meet 
Phillips' standard of inherent reliability before the trial court can proceed to consider the 
normal foundational questions appropriate to any expert testimony." Id. at 398. 
As a result, "the trial court should carefully explore each logical link in the chain 
that leads to expert testimony given in court and determine its reliability." This did not 
occur in the present case. Defendant had a specific objection that Mr. Rollins testimony 
encompassed an unique science, and that further foundation needed to be laid in order for 
the testimony to be admissable. (V. 5, ps. 95-96). Mr. Rollins did not testify that his 
methods were generally acceptable in his field, or that the data he used was inherently 
reliable. Mr. Rollins did not know how many rehabilitationists existed, and conceded that 
the school where he got his degree no longer offers the degree. Mr. Rollins admitted he 
did nothing to verify his conclusions, and that his line of work is not an exact science, but 
an art. Finally, Mr. Rollins testified that he does not follow up on the majority of his 
patients to see if his conclusions were correct. The trial court applied an erroneous standard 
for the admission of evidence which is error as a matter of law and reviewed for correction. 
Stevenett v. Wal-mart Stores. Inc.. 977 P.2d 508 | 8(Utah App. 1999). 
Thus, the necessary foundation was not laid. The science employed was shown to 
be unique, but the inquiry required by Rimmasch was ignored. The testimony was actually 
shown to be unreliable. Accordingly, the opinion testimony was inadmissable and it was 
error for the trial court to allow it. Defendant suffered great prejudice in that the jury based 
the largest part of its verdict on future medical damages, and thus upon the faulty opinion 
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testimony of Mr. Rollins. This matter must be remanded for a new trial. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO CALL A 
WITNESS TO REBUT THE TESTIMONY ELICITED FROM DR. KNORPP 
ON A CROSS-EXAMINATION 
At trial, the defense presented Dr. Scott Knorpp as a medical expert to refute the 
claims of plaintiff s treating physicians that plaintiffs ongoing complaints were caused by 
the subject accident. On cross-examination, plaintiffs counsel focused primarily on two 
alleged telephone conversations which Dr. Knorpp had with plaintiffs physical therapist. 
The obvious purpose of this cross-examination was to attack Dr. Knorpp's veracity when 
Dr. Knorpp denied these allegations. Plaintiffs counsel then called plaintiffs physical 
therapist, over objection, to rebut the testimony of Dr. Knorpp elicited on cross-
examination by plaintiffs attorney. 
Rebuttal evidence has been defined as "evidence tending to refute, modify, explain, 
or otherwise minimize or nullify the effect of the opponent's evidence." Randle v. Allen. 
862 P.2d 1329, 1338 (Utah 1993)(emphasis added). "Rebuttal evidence should be limited 
to evidence made necessary by the opponent's case in reply, and evidence required to 
counter new facts presented in the defendant's case in-chief. The purpose of rebuttal 
evidence is not to merely contradict or corroborate evidence already presented, but to 
respond to new points or evidence first introduced by the opposing party." Astill v. Clark, 
956 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Utah App. 1998). As these cases suggest, rebuttal evidence is not 
proper unless it is made necessary by evidence presented in the opponent's case in-chief. 
The evidence at issue was not introduced by an opposing party. Instead, it was introduced 
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by plaintiff. Thus, no rebuttal can be allowed as to that evidence. 
Evidence first introduced by cross-examination cannot be considered evidence 
presented by the opponent's case in-chief State v. Barney, 681 P.2d 1230, 1231 (Utah 
1984). Here, the defendant's case in-chief, and specifically its direct examination of Dr. 
Knorpp made no mention of alleged conversations between Dr. Knorpp and the plaintiffs 
physical therapist. These alleged conversations were brought up by plaintiffs counsel 
during his cross-examination of Dr. Knorpp; in fact, they were the main focus of his cross-
examination. Having elicited the expected denials regarding his alleged inflammatory 
remarks to the physical therapist, plaintiffs counsel was then allowed to complete his 
ambush of Dr. Knorpp and the defense by calling the physical therapist to rebut testimony 
first introduced during plaintiffs counsel's cross-examination. 
Based on the case law above, it is clearly improper to allow plaintiffs attorney to 
call a rebuttal witness to rebut evidence he himself had elicited. As stated in Astill v. 
Clark, "the purpose of rebuttal evidence is not merely to contradict or corroborate evidence 
already presented, but to respond to new points in evidence first introduced by the 
opposing party." Id. at 1086. Federal case law also supports defendant's contention that it 
was improper to allow plaintiffs physical therapist to testify as a rebuttal witness. In Koch 
v. Koch Industries. Inc.. 203 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2000), the Tenth Circuit upheld a district 
court's refusal to allow plaintiffs attorney to call a rebuttal witness for testimony that 
plaintiffs counsel had intentionally elicited from defendant's witness on cross-
examination. The Court held: 
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Contrary to plaintiffs assertion in support of their argument for a rebuttal witness, 
Markol did not dispute Hall's testimony, but rather disagreed with the testimony it 
gives. Further, even if Markol had disputed Hall's testimony, the plaintiffs attorney 
intentionally elicited such testimony... when an attorney conducting cross-
examination affirmatively doles out specific testimony, as it occurred here, the 
district court does not abuse using its discretion in disallowing rebuttal to that 
testimony. 
Koch, 203 F.3d at 1226. 
The testimony of Dr. Knorpp came as no surprise to plaintiff. The cross-
examination of Dr. Knorpp was a trap that plaintiff anticipated well before trial. Courts 
have rejected the use of such rebuttal testimony. In Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1024 
(Utah 1994), the Supreme Court articulated a "reasonable anticipated test" to determine 
whether rebuttal testimony should be allowed. The court stated: "The issue hinges on 
whether the evidence 'sought to be rebutted could reasonably have been anticipated prior to 
trial.'" Turner, 872 P.2d at 1023. Not only had plaintiff anticipated Dr. Knorpp's 
testimony, but plaintiffs counsel deliberately solicited such testimony so that he could then 
attempt to rebut the testimony with plaintiffs physical therapist. Federal courts have held 
that evidence that was available to plaintiff during his case in-chief and not unexpected, is 
not proper rebuttal evidence. Pandit v. American Honda Co., Inc., 82 F.3d 376, 383 (10th 
Cir. 1996); Lubanski v. Coleco Ind.. 929 F.2d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 1991). 
By allowing the therapist to rebut Dr. Knorpp, plaintiff was given the last word and 
was allowed to sandwich the defense on an inflammatory issue. The inflammatory nature 
of this evidence is underscored by plaintiffs closing arguments a conspiracy exists 
between defendant's counsel and Dr. Knorpp. (V. 8, ps. 13, 84, 85, 86, 89). It was error to 
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allow the rebuttal witness, and this error resulted in significant prejudice. As such, a new 
trial must be granted. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCUSED MR. TAMS AS A 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR 
It was error for the trial court to excuse Mr. Tams for cause. The total inquiry 
regarding Mr. Tams is reproduced in Addendum C. In essence, Mr. Tams related that his 
daughter was involved as a defendant in a lawsuit in New York. Mr. Tams raised the issue 
of the now famous McDonalds hot coffee case, but conceded: 
I just felt that that coffee case was excessive based on the way it was reported. 
Certainly not from anything factual. That's one of those things where I think it 
would be difficult for me, based on what I know of that, to have awarded the 
amounts that were awarded. If it was justified in some way that I don't know of 
now, the story behind the store type thing, it wouldn't then be a problem. 
(V. 1, p. 97). Mr. Tams did not believe juries were out of control. Mr. Tams even 
indicated that he would be inclined under the right circumstances to award a significant 
verdict. Regarding a hypothetical case involving a daughter, Mr. Tams indicated that he 
would probably give great weight to his daughter's statement, but would still endeavor to 
try the case on its merits. The sum and substance of Mr. Tams' statements were that he 
would try to be fair and impartial and look at the merits of any given case. 
The erroneous exclusion of Mr. Tams effectively gave the plaintiff more peremptory 
challenges than the defendant. Mr. Tams indicated that he would evaluate each case on its 
own merits, which is all that can be expected from any juror. In reviewing the exchange 
above, this court must contemplate the exchange between the court and the juror as a 
whole, not focusing on a single remark. State v. Young. 853 P.2d 327,343 (Utah 1993). 
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On balance, Mr. Tarns was impartial. Even if an inference of bias could be found, which it 
cannot, the trial court failed to rehabilitate the juror as required. "Utah law requires trial 
courts to expend significant effort in rehabilitating a potential juror to whom even an 
inference of bias has attached.." State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah App. 1994), 
revM on other grounds, State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503 (Utah 1997). See also, Rasmussen v. 
Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 395 (Utah App. 1995). The trial court is required to rehabilitate 
until the suggestion of bias is dispelled. State v. Morgan, 865 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Utah App. 
1993). The trial court failed in this regard and defendant was prejudiced. Mr. Tams 
presence on the jury could have significantly changed the verdict. 
In People v. Lefebre, 5 P.3d 295 (Colo. 2000), the court held that it was reversable 
error to excuse a juror for cause without a proper basis. The Lefebre court followed its 
own precedent in Bustamante v. People, 297 P.2d 538, 540 (Colo. 1956) which recognized 
that erroneously dismissing a juror for cause effectively gives an adversary an additional 
peremptory challenge, which creates an imbalance between the parties and undermines the 
essential purpose of peremptory challenges. Id Accordingly, the trial court committed 
reversable error when it excused Mr. Tams. The trial court applied an erroneous standard 
in finding that Mr. Tams should be excused. Likewise, the trial court failed to meet its 
obligation to rehabilitate Mr. Tams further. 
VI. THE ERRORS COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT CONSTITUTE 
CUMULATIVE ERROR 
While it is clear that the trial court committed error in the proceedings presented 
here, defendant is cognizant that the majority of issues are reviewed under an abuse of 
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discretion standard. Even under this standard, reversal is required. Reversal is required 
because of the prejudice suffered by the defendant. Moreover, even if the individual issues 
presented above do not warrant reversal, the errors amount to cumulative error in that they 
collectively undermine any conclusion that a fair trial occurred. Where the cumulative 
effect of several errors undermine an appellate court's confidence that the defendant had a 
fair trial, reversal is mandated. Whitehead v. American Motor Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 
928 (Utah 1990). Absent these errors, the verdict in this matter would have been different. 
Thus, the defendant has suffered great prejudice and reversal is mandated. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the defendant was not given a fair trial in this matter, this matter must be 
reversed. Plaintiffs surprise evidence alone warrants a new trial. Trials by ambush simply. 
cannot be countenanced by this court. The arguments of counsel as allowed by the trial 
court further prejudice the defendant inviting the jury to render its verdict on an 
inflammatory basis. The jury should have been advised as to where the defendant was. 
The fact that the trial court allowed the defendant to advise the jury as to the defendant's 
exact location at the end of trial, does not undue the prejudice suffered by the defendant 
during the course of that trial. More importantly, the manacles placed upon the defendant 
by the court at the plaintiffs urging were most prejudicial given the statements made by 
the defendant in closing arguments. Those arguments constitute a basis for reversal even 
under the plain error standard. Lastly, given all the facts and circumstances of the case, 
this court's confidence in a fair trial must be undermined and a new trial must be granted. 
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For the foregoing reasons, defendant requests this court to reverse the trial court and order 
a new trial in this matter. 
DATED AND SIGNED th is^day of Novejaber, 2001 
R. MIL IVIE 
)AVID N. MORTENSEN 
'I VIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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LYNN C. HARRIS (1382) 
HARRIS & CARTER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3325 No. Univ. Ave., Ste. 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 375-9801 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
RHONDA MERRYWEATHER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARSON R. CALLISTER, 
Defendant. 
—oooOooo— 
THIS ACTION came on for trial before the Court and Jury, Honorable Ben 
H. Hadfield, District Court Judge, presiding, and the issues have been duly tried 
and the Jury having duly rendered its verdict by special verdict form on October 
3, 2000, 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiff, Rhonda Merryweather, 
recover from the defendant, Carson R. Callister, the sums of: 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 980100391 
Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
711 
(a) $1,300,568.00 in special and general damages, and 
(b) the sum of $ *4£"74 . V*/ which is interest on the sum of 
$13,000.00 awarded for past medical damages, through October 3, 
2000, and 
(c) plus court costs in the sum of $ S~l % ZL , o X 
WSE 
DATED this IP day of Octobej 
22= 
CLERK OF 
First Judicial 
Box Elder County 
)F THECOURt - 3 : ^ / \ 
icial Distric(/ \ /'-Z.^.rtff. 
r County ^ i ^ ' ~' '"rVCid^ X3 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing on this \y^ day of October, 2000, by first-class, U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid to the following: 
R. Phillips Ivie 
Sherlynn Fenstermaker 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North University Ave. 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, UT 84603 
I p.f\tCi\^ ^ { A f r r i v v 
' ' Secretary 
1 •9 i ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 9801003 91 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail LYNN C HARRIS 
ATTORNEY PLA 
3325 N.UNIVERSITY 
AVE.STE.200B 
JAMESTOWN SQ.,CLOCKTOWER 
BLDG. 
PROVO, UT 846040000 
Mail RAY PHILLIPS IVIE 
ATTORNEY DEF 
226 W 2230 N STE 210 
PO BOX 657 
PROVO UT 84603 
Dated this cM5 day of (SlCA , 206>0 dhzL 
QJtfrft-fc 
Deputy Court Clerk 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RHONDA MERRYWEATHER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARSON R. CALLISTER, 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Case No. 980100391 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of the 
evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue 
presented, answer "Yes." If you find the evidence is so equally balanced that 
you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the 
evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer "No." Also, any 
damages assessed must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The defendant, Carson Callister, has admitted negligence at the time of 
the collision. 
1. Was defendant Carson Callister's negligence a proximate cause of the 
injuries claimed by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes ><f No 
If you answered question 1 "No," please sign the verdict form and return 
it to the Court. If you answered question 1 "Yes," continue. 
2. Has the plaintiff incurred at least $3000.00 in medical expenses as a 
result of defendant's negligence? 
ANSWER: Yes \ No 
70S 
3. As a result of the defendant's negligence, did the plaintiff sustain a 
permanent disability or a permanent impairment based upon objective 
findings? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
If you answered either 2 or 3 or both "Yes," continue. If you answer 2 
and 3 "No," please sign the verdict form and return it to the Court. 
4. State the amount of special and general damages, if any, sustained by 
the plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries complained of. If such 
questions were not answered "Yes," do not answer this question. 
Special Damages: 
A. Past medical damages $ l . ^ m n 
B. Future medical damages $ 1/*v 5fo% 
C. Loss of Past and 
Future Earnings $ 2J^O;QOQ 
General Damages $ 7&LfCF> 
TOTAL $ 1 300,5h& 
Dated this the S%EO day of Qc.7&R 2000. 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH/ 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
RHONDA MERRYWEATHER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARSON R. CALLISTER, 
Defendant. 1 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 980100391 
HON. BEN H. HADFIELD 
This matter comes before the court on Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. The court 
requested supplemental memoranda pursuant to its memorandum decision of 27 December 2000. The 
court has considered the memoranda supporting and opposing the original motion as well as the 
supplemental memoranda and the argument presented at the hearing on this matter held 1 March 2001. 
A review of the case law indicates that the court cannot now raise the inconsistency in the verdict. Only 
Defendant's Rule 59(a) motion remains for consideration. 
I. 
Defendant argues that he was surprised at trial by the revelation that Plaintiff was demoted 
from her job. Defendant argues that such surprise allows a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(3). 
Notably, Defendant does not indicate an interrogatory response that should have been supplemented 
JI3V 
2 
according to the old Rule 26(e)(2) that is applicable to this case.] Nor does the Defendant proffer what 
evidence he could offer on the issue at a retrial. Rather, the Defendant argues that its trial strategy was 
to argue an increase in Plaintiffs earnings that cast doubt on both the Plaintiffs lost earnings and the 
significance of Plaintiff s injuries and that the "surprise" testimony eviscerated that strategy. 
Both Defendant and Plaintiff listed the hospital administrator, Mr. Jex, as a potential 
witness. There is no dispute that Plaintiff had, in a number of disclosures, indicated the Plaintiffs 
ongoing problems at her work. The crux of the disagreement over this issue is Defendant's insistence 
that Plaintiffs counsel knew about the demotion on the first day of trial as evidenced by his opening 
statement. Defendant incorrectly points to the decrease in hours from full time to 32 hours a week as 
the nondisclosed demotion, when, in fact, the demotion was from a 32 hour a week job as an 
administrator to a floor nurse position. The difference explains the comments of Plaintiff s counsel at 
the time the court considered the matter as opposed to Counsel's opening statement. Defendant was 
on notice that Plaintiff took issue with Defendant's theory of the case. Any surprise over the demotion 
was due as much to Defendant's failure to learn of the problems as it was due to Plaintiffs failure to 
disclose them. 
Further, the court limited Plaintiffs expert to use of exhibits created before the revelation 
on Plaintiffs demotion. Although the Plaintiff sought to introduce modified versions of the exhibits 
that took into account the demotion, the court denied Plaintiffs request. The court restricted Plaintiff 
to damage calculations made prior to the demotion. The court cannot grant Defendant a new trial on 
the basis of the alleged surprise. 
*The court notes that the result might be different under the new rule which requires 
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II. 
Defendant next argues that the court should not have allowed Plaintiff to introduce evidence 
impeaching Dr. Knorpp's testimony regarding a telephone conversation he had with the physical 
therapist. Defendant admitted at the hearing in this matter that the rebuttal testimony may have been 
proper 608(c) evidence of bias. Defendant argues that the evidence was improper rebuttal evidence 
as it was offered to rebut cross examination testimony elicited by Plaintiff. If the evidence could be 
properly admitted under 608(c) then it could be admitted whether or not Dr. Knorpp testified about the 
telephone conversation. A witness's bias is not put in issue until he or she testifies. Once a witness 
testifies, Rule 608(c) allows evidence of bias to be presented by extrinsic evidence. The rebuttal was 
Plaintiffs only opportunity to present extrinsic evidence of bias as Dr. Knorpp was called during the 
Defendants case. It is coincidental that the evidence of bias in this case also impugned the credibility 
of Dr. Knorpp on other grounds. The court will not grant a new trial on the rebuttal testimony issue. 
III. 
The Defendant raises several grounds for a new trial that can be lumped into the category 
"misconduct of counsel." Plaintiff counsel's statements, when taken in context, would not have caused 
the jury to perceive impecuniosity. Counsel made the statements in connection with his theme of 
charging the party who "started the fire," not in the context of Plaintiff s inability to pay. The court 
gave cautionary instructions to both the jury and to Plaintiffs counsel when he stepped too close to the 
line. For example, stating in the presence of the jury that counsel was not under oath and should limit 
himself to questions. In another instance the court sustained the Defendant's objection during counsel's 
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closing argument. Notably, in the last instance, the Defendant did not request any curative instruction 
to the jury regarding the remark. Defense counsel also "apologized" and told the jury to disregard his 
personal feelings about the case. Defendant now argues that the "apology" actually reinforced the 
improper comment. The Defendant did not, however, object to the apology or request any curative 
instruction. The Defendant cannot now complain that the "apology" and the court's sustaining the 
objection did not cure the improper comment. The court does not believe that the instances cited by 
Defendant rise to the level of error. If they did, it was harmless error. 
IV. 
Defendant in the alternative asks for a remittiture but provides no authorities on the issue. 
At its most fundamental level, this case troubles the court. The simplicity of the accident; the almost 
eight month period between the accident and the onset of any documented, significant medical 
problems; and the nature of the injuries all make the 1.3 million dollar verdict the appropriate subject 
of careful scrutiny. Defendant's argument at the hearing on this matter that this is the largest soft tissue 
verdict ever in Utah, is not lost on the court. The court has carefully reviewed the arguments of counsel 
and the conduct of the trial. Despite repeated efforts to find a good reason to grant a new trial, the court 
in every instance comes back to the fundamental issue: there was evidence presented to the jury that 
supports the verdict. This court viewed the evidence and witnesses in a different light than did the 
jury.2 The court was extremely surprised by the size of the verdict. After considerable reflection, the 
court recognizes that the difference between the jury's verdict and an award which the court would have 
2The court is aware of Canon 3(B)(10) and has complied with the Canon. No criticism 
has been leveled at the verdict other than in this opinion. 
5 
thought appropriate is grounded in the determination of which witnesses are most credible. On this 
issue the court is not willing to substitute its views for those of the jury. The court would not hesitate 
to grant a new trial if it could, in good conscience, say that there was a part of the verdict that did not 
have evidentiary support. The court also searched for evidence of passion or prejudice in this case and 
cannot point to any evidence that the jury was influenced by any improper motive. The court does not 
believe that the verdict rises to the level that, as a matter of law, it indicates passion or prejudice. The 
special verdict in each category had evidentiary support. 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for a new trial is, somewhat reluctantly, 
denied. Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to prepare an Order in conformance with this 
Memorandum Decision. 
-n it-Dated this I day of March 2001. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of March, 2001,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, in the case of Merryweather vs. Callister, case 
number 980100391, as follows: 
R. Phil Ivie 
Attorney At Law 
226 West 2230 North 
Suite 120 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Lynn C. Harris 
Attorney At Law 
3325 North University Avenue 
Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604, 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
* 
* 
* 
RHONDA MERRYWEATHER, * 
* 
Plaintiff, * MEMORANDUM DECISION 
* 
v. * 
* 
CARSON R. CALLISTER * Case No: 980100391 
* 
* 
* 
Defendants. * 
This case is before the court on Defendant's motion for a new trial or in the 
alternative for a remittiture. The oral argument on Defendant's motion has been set 
for 5 February 2001. The court has considered the pleadings of the parties as well 
as the file in this matter. 
The court notes that the verdict awarded only $ 13,000.00 of past medical 
damages. The parties stipulated that $ 42,421.26 in past medical damages were 
incurred by the Plaintiff although defendant argued strenuously that part of the past 
medicals were a result of Plaintiff s psychological and family problems. On this 
issue the jury attributed only thirty-one percent of the medical expenses to Defendant. 
The jury awarded $ 715,000.00 in future medical damages or one-hundred percent of 
the amount indicated by Plaintiffs expert. The inconsistent awards are troublesome. 
The court desires to give the parties the opportunity to more fully brief the 
issues surrounding a remittiture. Should the parties believe it necessary, the court 
is even willing to allow time for the record to be transcribed so that the parties and 
the court have an opportunity to fully consider the record before denying or granting 
a new trial or considering a remittiture. 
The parties are granted an additional twenty days to file memoranda relating 
to the issue of a remittiture. Each party shall file a memorandum and there shall be 
no replies. This matter will remain scheduled for 5 February 2000 unless either party 
requests an extension of time to obtain transcription of the record. 
Dated this 21 day of December, 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
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Ray Phillips Ivie 
Attorney At Law 
226 W. 2230 N., Suite 210 
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1 CONCERN IS DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU CAN BE FAIR TO BOTH SIDES? 
2 MS. SALE: I THINK SO. YEAH, I THINK I COULD. 
3 MR. HARRIS: I THINK WHAT YOU'RE FEELING IS THE 
4 WEIGHT OF BEING A JUROR. 
5 THE COURT: AND THAT'S NOT BAD. IT IS A BIG 
6 RESPONSIBILITY. 
7 MR. HARRIS: I'M NOT SO SURE OTHER PEOPLE WOULD 
8 HAVE RAISED THEIR HAND. 
9 MR. IVIE: I HAVE NO QUESTIONS, YOUR HONOR. 
10 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. YOU MAY GO BACK INTO THE 
11 COURTROOM. THANK YOU. WE NEED MR. TAMS NOW. WE SAVED THE 
12 NICEST CHAIR IN THE OFFICE FOR YOU. 
13 MR. TAMS: THANK YOU. I'LL TRY NOT TO GO TO SLEEP. 
14 THE COURT: IN THE QUESTIONING IN THERE YOU RAISED 
15 YOUR HAND ABOUT BEING AWARE OF SOME POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT 
16 ISSUE. I'LL ALLOW MR. HARRIS TO ASK ONE OR TWO QUESTIONS 
17 AND THEN MR. IVIE. 
18 MR. HARRIS: I WANT TO ASK WHAT YOU'VE SEEN AND 
19 THEN IF YOU'VE DRAWN ANY CONCLUSIONS OR PRECONCEIVED IDEAS 
20 OR ANYTHING ABOUT THAT? 
21 MR. TAMS: THERE'S A COUPLE OF THINGS IT GOES BACK 
22 TO. ONE IS CERTAINLY WITH MY DAUGHTER AND THE LAWSUIT SHE'S 
23 IN. THAT DOES PUT A LITTLE STRESS ON IT. 
24 MR. HARRIS: IS SHE THE DEFENDANT IN THAT ONE? 
25 MR. TAMS: SHE IS. 
1 MR. HARRIS: THAT'S THE ONE IN NEW YORK? 
2 MR. TAMS: YES. ALSO WHAT I HEARD IN THE 
3 QUESTIONING WAS SOMETHING ABOUT HAVE YOU HEARD ANYTHING ON 
4 THIS CASE. WHAT I MEAN I S ABOUT EXCESSIVE AWARDS OF 
5 COMPENSATION. SOME THINGS THAT COME TO MY MIND ARE THINGS 
6 LIKE THE SPILLED COFFEE AND THE AWARD THERE. THAT DOES 
7 BOTHER ME A LITTLE B I T . OF COURSE, I DON'T KNOW ALL THE 
8 FACTS OF THE CASE, BUT I T DOES BOTHER ME. 
9 MR. HARRIS: DOES HEARING THE NAME MCDONALD'S HOT 
10 COFFEE CASE, HAS THAT - - BEFORE YOU CAME HERE TODAY, BEFORE 
11 YOU HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT THIS CASE, DID YOU HAVE ANY 
12 PRECONCEIVED NOTIONS ABOUT LAWSUITS AND LAWSUITS FOR 
13 INJURIES? 
14 MR. TAMS: LIKE I SAY, NOT IN THIS CASE BECAUSE I 
15 DON'T KNOW ALL OF THE DETAILS. I JUST FELT THAT THAT COFFEE 
16 CASE WAS EXCESSIVE, BASED ON THE WAY I T WAS REPORTED. 
17 CERTAINLY NOT FROM ANYTHING FACTUAL. THAT'S ONE OF THOSE 
18 THINGS WHERE I THINK IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR ME, BASED ON 
19 WHAT I KNOW OF THAT, TO HAVE AWARDED THE AMOUNTS THAT WERE 
20 AWARDED. IF IT WAS JUSTIFIED IN SOME WAY THAT I DON'T KNOW 
2 1 OF NOW, THE STORY BEHIND THE STORY TYPE THING, I T WOULDN'T 
22 THEN BE A PROBLEM. 
23 MR. HARRIS: DO YOU COME TO COURT TODAY WITH ANY 
24 KIND OF PRECONCEIVED NOTION THAT J U R I E S ARE OUT OF WHACK OR 
25 OUT OF CONTROL? 
\Tr\l n m o 1 r>"f Q 
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MR. TAMS: NO. 
MR. HARRIS: AT LEAST NOT IN UTAH. ANY NOTIONS 
ABOUT WHETHER THINGS SHOULD BE CAPPED OR LIMITED OR RIGHTS 
TAKEN AWAY? SOME PEOPLE READ THAT STUFF AND END UP WITH 
SOME PRETTY INTERESTING IDEAS. THAT'S WHY WE DON'T WANT TO 
TALK ABOUT THEM IN FRONT OF THE WHOLE PANEL. 
MR. TAMS: NO. 
MR. HARRIS: OTHER THAN YOUR THOUGHTS ABOUT WHAT 
YOU HAVE EXPRESSED TODAY ABOUT YOUR DAUGHTER AND THE 
MCDONALD'S CASE, DO YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEM IN ASSURING US THAT 
YOU CAN BE FAIR TO BOTH SIDES AND BE IMPARTIAL? 
MR. TAMS: THAT'S ONE OF THOSE THINGS, WHERE YOU 
HAVE A DAUGHTER SIMILARLY INVOLVED, IT'S KIND OF EMOTIONAL. 
I DO HAVE TO SAY THAT I REALLY THINK I COULD, BUT WHEN YOU 
START TO TALK ABOUT THOSE EMOTIONS, THERE'S GOING TO BE 
SOMETHING IN THE BACK OF MY MIND. 
THE COURT: LET ME ASK YOU A FOLLOW UP QUESTION, 
MR. TAMS. YOU HAVE ANOTHER DAUGHTER THAT HAS A TRACK 
SCHOLARSHIP TO BYU. IF SHE WERE INJURED IN AN ACCIDENT AND 
COULD NO LONGER RUN, WOULD YOU FEEL THAT SHE SHOULD RECEIVE 
FAIR COMPENSATION FOR THAT? 
MR. TAMS: CERTAINLY. THAT'S THE THING. 
THE COURT: IN HER CIRCUMSTANCES IT MIGHT BE 
SIGNIFICANT COMPENSATION, WOULD YOU THINK? 
MR. TAMS: I'M SURE IT WOULD BE. 
1 MR. HARRIS: DON'T BE SHY. 
2 THE COURT: JUST TELL US WHAT YOU THINK. I KNOW 
3 YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE DAUGHTER. 
4 MR. TAMS: AGAIN, THAT CASE IS CLOSE ON MY MIND. 
5 WE'VE DISCUSSED CERTAIN ASPECTS OF WHAT SHE'S GOING THROUGH. 
6 I WOULD DO MY BEST TO LOOK AT THE FACTS AND DECIDE BASED ON 
7 THE FACTS THAT ARE PRESENTED AND MAKE A DETERMINATION OF 
8 WHAT IS FACT AND GO FROM THERE. 
9 MR. HARRIS: IT'S SOMETHING YOU WOULD JUST DO OR 
10 SOMETHING YOU THINK YOU CAN DO? 
11 MR. TAMS: I THINK I CAN. IT'S KIND OF HARD TO SAY 
12 ABSOLUTELY. I THINK I CAN. 
13 MR. IVIE: IF YOUR DAUGHTER WHO IS THE TRACK STAR 
14 HAD AN INJURY AND IT WAS THE TYPE OF INJURY THAT.YOU FELT 
15 THE PERSON SHE WAS CLAIMING WAS RESPONSIBLE WAS NOT 
16 RESPONSIBLE, WOULD YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEM IN THAT PERSON NOT 
17 BEING HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR HER INJURY? 
18 MR. TAMS: WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT THAT YOU'RE TALKING 
19 KIND OF PERSONAL. IN A GENERAL SENSE I COULD SAY YES. 
20 WOULD I GIVE GREAT CREDENCE TO MY DAUGHTER'S STATEMENT? 
21 YES. IT WOULD -- IF IT WERE PROVED TO ME THAT IT WAS NOT 
22 THE CASE, THEN I COULD MAKE THE RIGHT DECISION IN THAT CASE. 
23 MR. IVIE: THE COURT WILL TELL YOU THAT THE BURDEN 
24 OF PROOF IN A CASE LIKE THIS IS ON THE PLAINTIFF TO PROVE 
25 THEIR CASE. DO YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH THAT CONCEPT? 
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MR. TAMS: NO, 
MR. IVIE: NOTHING FURTHER. 
THE COURT: YOU MAY GO BACK INTO THE COURTROOM. 
THANK YOU. 
COUNSEL, LET ME JUST MAKE THIS OBSERVATION. IF WE KEEP 
HIM, WE'VE GOT 21. IF I SEND HIM OUT IT DOESN'T CREATE A 
BIG PROBLEM. 
THE CLERK: THERE'S ANOTHER JUROR WHO WOULD LIKE TO 
COME BACK. THAT'S DANNY ANDERSON. 
MR. HARRIS: MR. TAMS SORT OF TALKS BOTH SIDES OF 
THE FENCE. 
THE COURT: I'LL LEAVE IT TO THE TWO OF YOU. I 
THINK, IF YOU WANT TO EXCUSE HIM FOR CAUSE, I'LL SEND HIM 
AWAY. HE WOULD BE A VERY INTELLIGENT AND VERY DILIGENT 
JUROR, WHICH IS WHAT YOU WANT. BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, HE'S 
RAISED ENOUGH OF AN ISSUE THAT IF ONE SIDE WANTS HIM OUT 
I'LL GRANT IT. 
MR. HARRIS: I WOULD MAKE THAT MOTION. 
MR. IVIE: I WOULD OBJECT. THERE'S VERY SPECIFIC 
STATUTORY GROUNDS TO DISMISS. I DON'T SEE ANYTHING THAT 
WOULD SUPPORT A FINDING THAT HE IS PREJUDICED AND WOULDN'T 
GIVE BOTH SIDES A FAIR TRIAL. 
THE COURT: HE'S INDICATED THAT HE WOULD, BUT AT 
THE SAME TIME HE STRUGGLED SIGNIFICANTLY ON SEVERAL 
OCCASIONS INDICATING HOW MUCH THE ISSUE WITH HIS DAUGHTER IN 
1 NEW YORK WEIGHS ON HIS MIND AND HOW EMOTIONALLY ATTACHED HE 
2 IS TO THAT. HE BELIEVES HE COULD SET IT ASIDE. HE REALLY 
3 STRUGGLED IN THAT ANSWER AND IT APPEARED TO THE COURT 
4 THAT --WE DON'T KNOW ANY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THAT 
5 LAWSUIT, OTHER THAN HE VERY MUCH EMPATHIZED WITH HIS 
6 DAUGHTER AND FELT IT WAS A TREMENDOUS ISSUE FOR HIM AND FOR 
7 HER. 
8 MR. IVIE: DOES THAT MEAN THAT WE CAN STRIKE ALL 
9 THE PEOPLE WHOSE SPOUSES HAVE PLAINTIFF'S LAWSUITS GOING ON? 
10 WE'VE GOT THAT AS WELL. PEOPLE BRING IN THEIR LIFE 
11 EXPERIENCES AND THE ONLY WAY THAT WE CAN STATUTORILY STRIKE 
12 THEM IS IF THEY SAY THAT THEY CANNOT BE UNBIASED. YOU SAID 
13 YOURSELF HE'D BE A CONSCIENTIOUS JUROR. HE'D BE A GOOD, 
14 HARD WORKING JUROR. AND HE WAS CANDID WITH US. HE TRIED TO 
15 BE HONEST AND TELL US THINGS SO THAT COUNSEL CAN EXERCISE AN 
16 INFORMED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE. 
17 THE COURT: LET'S HOLD THAT ONE FOR A MINUTE. 
18 MR. HARRIS: IF I MAY MAKE THIS COMMENT TO MR. 
19 IVIE'S COMMENTS. WHAT HE SAID WAS THAT IN AN OBJECTIVE SORT 
20 OF GENERAL WAY HE WOULD TRY TO DO THAT, BUT HE HAD HUGE 
21 RESERVATIONS AS TO HIS CURRENT STATUS AND WHETHER HE WOULD 
22 BE ABLE TO DO THAT. THAT GOES SPECIFICALLY TO WHETHER HE 
23 CAN BE IMPARTIAL AND UNBIASED. THAT'S THE BASIS FOR THE 
24 CAUSE. 
25 THE COURT: LET'S BRING IN DANNY ANDERSON FOR A 
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THE COURT: I WILL EXCUSE HIM AT THIS TIME. AS I 
INDICATED TO COUNSEL, I THINK HE'D BE AN EXCELLENT JUROR, 
BUT I DID NOTE HOW MUCH HE SEEMED TO STRUGGLE WITH THAT 
ISSUE AND WITH HIS EMPATHY FOR HIS DAUGHTER. I'M AFRAID 
THAT HE MAY SIMPLY IDENTIFY WITH THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS 
CASE. 
THAT LEAVES US WITH 19. I SUPPOSE WE CAN GO BACK IN 
NOW AND SELECT ABOUT THREE OR FOUR MORE. THAT'S GOING TO 
INVOLVE BACKING UP AND DOING A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS AGAIN. 
I'M NOT GOING TO GIVE YOU EACH 2 0 MINUTES MORE VOIR DIRE, 
BUT WHAT I THINK I WILL DO IS MOVE EVERYBODY UP IN THE 
SEATING CHART. THE NEXT THREE OR FOUR THAT I CALL WILL BE 
AT THE VERY BACK END, SO THAT AT BEST THEY'LL ONLY BE CALLED 
AS ALTERNATES. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY'LL ONLY BE NUMBERS --
MR. HARRIS: YOU'RE NOT GOING TO REPLACE THESE, 
JUST STICK THE OTHERS ON THE END? 
THE COURT: YES. ON THE BACK ROW EVERYBODY WILL 
SHIFT TO THE LEFT AND WE'LL PUT THE NEXT THREE OR FOUR ON 
THE RIGHT END OF THAT ROW. 
MR. HARRIS: I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THAT. 
MR. IVIE: NO OBJECTION. 
THE COURT: I'LL DO AN EXPEDITED QUESTIONING AND 
GIVE YOU EACH MAYBE FIVE MINUTES. 
MR. HARRIS: ALL I'M REALLY INTERESTED IN IS IF 
THEY HEARD THE QUESTIONS I RAISED AND HEARD THE QUESTIONS 
